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                                               Abstract 
Banks are more liquid, better capitalised, and more profitable in oil-dependent countries. 
However, bank credit to the private sector is relatively low as a percentage of GDP. The low 
level has been blamed, amongst other reasons, on governments’ reliance on the banking sector 
to finance fiscal deficits. This study examines the crowding out effect of government domestic 
borrowing using a panel data model for 28 oil-dependent countries over the period 1990-2012. 
We estimate the model, using both fixed-effects and generalised method of moments estimators 
and find that a one percent increase in government borrowing from domestic banks significantly 
decreases private sector credit by 0.22 percent and has no significant impact on the lending rate 
banks charge to the private sector. This finding suggests that government domestic borrowing 
has resulted in  the shrinking of private credit and works through the credit channel and not the 
interest rate channel.  
The economic dynamics of oil-rich countries are mainly determined by the world prices of oil 
and gas and thus possess certain characteristics not shared by other economies. Over the last 
decade, oil-dependent countries have made some attempts to diversify towards the non-oil 
sector; in particular, significant priority has been given to the financial sector. This study 
explores the impact of bank credit in the growth of oil-rich economies and tests if it differs in 
 iii 
the emerging non-oil sectors. We utilize both the panel cointegration and pooled mean group 
techniques for 28 oil-dependent countries spanning 1990-2012. The findings suggest that bank 
credit has a positive significant effect on GDP per capita growth (i.e by 0.06 percent) but no 
significant impact on non-oil GDP per capita growth. Hence, banks do not yet provide adequate 
credit to stimulate non-oil economic growth. The growth of non-hydrocarbon activity depends 
mainly on government spending through hydrocarbon revenues.  
 
Keywords: Private sector credit, Government domestic borrowing, Non-oil economic growth, 
Oil-dependent economies, Pooled mean group, Generalised method of moments. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1  Background to the Problem 
Hydrocarbons account for a substantial share of total export and/or government revenues in oil-
rich countries. Hydrocarbons are directly linked to the petroleum and gas industries, for 
example, (i) exploration and production, (ii) transport by pipelines (iii) processing facilities (oil 
refineries, liquefaction terminals); while non-hydrocarbons are not directly linked to them. A 
country is oil-rich if the share of hydrocarbons contributes at least 25% of total fiscal revenues 
and/or total exports (IMF, 2012). Such dependence is as high as 90% in Algeria, Angola, 
Azerbaijan, Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea and Venezuela, etc. and as low as 25% in Malaysia, 
Indonesia, and Vietnam (WDI, 2014). Natural resources (even though agriculture, forestry, 
fishing could be classified as natural resources, this research study defines ‘natural resources’ 
as the extractive industries or resources in the form of oil and gas) are a gift of nature and 
countries with this resources are expected to be better-off than countries that do not have them. 
Theoretically, abundant natural resources are expected to promote growth, for the reason that 
resource richness can give a ‘big push’ to the economy through added investment in economic 
infrastructure and human capital. However, in spite of the additional economic opportunities 
offered by resource abundance, economic development in resource-rich countries has been 
disappointing on average – a phenomenon known as the Natural Resource Curse (Sachs and 
Warner 1995, 2001). 
Various reasons have been identified for failures to effectively transform natural resources to 
growth and development, notably (i) Dutch disease – based on the generally assumed 
experience of the Netherlands after a resource boom in the 1960s. This is a situation when 
revenues increase in the resource sector, which increases the demand for non-traded goods, 
draws production factors away from non-resource-traded sectors, and makes the nation's 
currency stronger (appreciates) which then renders other important sectors, i.e. the 
manufacturing sector, less competitive (Corden and Neary, 1982; Van Wijnbergen, 1984). 
Another explanation popular among researchers is (ii) transmission of commodity price 
volatility (especially when exports and revenues are concentrated) – this is when a national 
economy dominated by resource extraction is heavily exposed to the relatively high commodity 
price volatility and thus to macroeconomic volatility (Van der Ploeg, 2011; Frankel, 2010), 
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which is not conducive for economic growth; and more importantly (iii) rent-seeking, and 
deterioration of institutions – that is differences in the quality of institutions such as bureaucratic 
quality, legal and political systems, rule of law as well as property rights determine whether 
natural resources are beneficial or harmful to an economy (Mehlum et al., 2006).  
Natural resources represent a large and growing prospect in resource-rich countries but the 
wealth has not led to sustainable and inclusive growth. Abundance of natural resources does 
not automatically or always lead to poor outcomes and, in fact, there is no monotonic effect of 
natural resource abundance on economic growth. For instance, United Arab Emirates turned 
the resource curse into a blessing by investing massively in modern infrastructure, creating 
employment, and improving social indicators (Fasano and Zubair, 2003); North America 
produces more oil than Africa, but it has one of the lowest resource rents as a share of GDP 
(International Energy Statistics, 2013);  Norway is one of the top exporters of crude oil in the 
world while maintaining a persistent lead in the United Nations Human Development Index 
(Human Development Report, 2015). There are also a few other ‘success stories’ explored in 
(Maehle, 2012): Chile, a copper producing country has diversified out of copper dependency 
and greatly reduced poverty; Indonesia, an oil-producing country with one of the most pro-poor 
growth episodes in modern economic history has made so much progress in agriculture and 
rural sector development; Peru, a mineral producing country has experienced stellar growth 
record in the last decade while reducing poverty by half; Botswana, a diamond-rich country is 
a successful story with a steady growth record.  
These experiences show that contrary to the conventional ‘resource curse’ assertions that 
natural resource endowments bring about economic stagnation, it is possible to transform 
mineral wealth into sustained development with significant welfare improvements for large 
segments of the population.  In fact, dependence and the ‘curse’ is not caused by an abundance 
but by policy failures. Therefore, the natural resource curse is neither universal nor inevitable. 
The resource curse could be the result or combination of, meagre productivity growth, abysmal 
labour force participation, poor institutions, stagnant human capital, Dutch disease, volatility 
of resource rents, or other factors. Therefore, there could be different channels through which 
this ‘curse’ may have manifested. Financial development constitutes a potentially important 
mechanism and thus financial sector might have played a role since finance is a major 
determinant of economic growth (King and Levine, 1993, Levine, 1997; Rajan and Zingales, 
1998). In other words, natural resource dominance could have a direct or indirect effect on 
economic growth through the financial sector (Hattendorff, 2014). 
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The financial sector comprises of bank-based (dominated by banks) and market-based financial 
systems (dominated by stock markets). The transfer of funds from agencies with surplus to 
agencies with deficit through financial intermediaries is called financial intermediation 
(Greenbaum, 2007). Financial intermediaries mediate between the providers and users of 
financial capital; they are financial institutions specialized in the activity of buying and selling 
of assets and financial contracts (Freixas and Rochet, 2008). Broadly defined, financial 
intermediary is an institution that facilitates the channelling of funds between lenders and 
borrowers indirectly. That is, savers (lenders) give funds to an intermediary institution (such as 
a bank), and that institution gives those funds to spenders (borrowers), this may be in the form 
of loans or mortgages (Wright and Quadrini, 2007). Alternatively, they may lend the money 
directly via the financial markets and eliminate the financial intermediary, which is known as 
financial disintermediation. Financial intermediaries include mainly banks, but also building 
societies, credit unions, insurance companies, collective investment schemes, pension funds, 
cooperative societies, micro-credit providers, etc. 
The existence and services of the financial markets are explained through the lens of 
information asymmetries and the agency theory which are aptly captured by the lack of 
complete information, high cost of transaction, and the method of regulation. The asymmetry 
can be ex ante generating the problem of adverse selection which is associated with moral 
hazard, or ex post leading to applying some costly verification and scrutiny measures. In 
the  model of perfect financial markets espoused in Arrow-Debreu (1954), perfect markets are 
characterized by certain conditions: access to the financial markets is free; information about 
borrowing and lending opportunities is freely available; and there are many traders, and no 
single trader can have a significant impact on market prices. The information asymmetry 
generates imperfections of the market which deviates from the core concepts of perfect capital 
markets. Asymmetric information and the inability of lenders to monitor borrowers lead to 
‘agency costs’ that increase the cost of external financing (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989). With 
imperfect information, capital is only available at a higher interest rate.  
Some of the imperfections caused by asymmetric information lead to the emergence of some 
form of transaction costs. Transaction costs are expenses incurred when buying or selling a 
good or service. The notion of transaction cost incorporates not only the costs regarding the 
transaction but also those for research, evaluation and monitoring. Transaction costs diminish 
returns, and over time reduce the amount of capital available to invest. When transaction costs 
diminish, the economy becomes more efficient, and more capital and labour are freed to 
produce wealth (Benston and Smith, 1976). However, the development of financial 
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intermediaries also hinges on the method of regulation. Government actions can significantly 
influence the path of development for financial intermediations (Merton, 1995). In fact, 
adequate institutional framework can influence the health, ability for refinancing and the 
method for recovering debts of financial intermediaries (Diamond and Rajan, 2000). 
Banks dominate the financial systems in resource-rich countries and most of the stock markets 
are in their nascent stages of development. In other words, market-based financial systems 
(dominated by stock markets) are small and in most cases, illiquid. For instance, in Nigeria, 
deposit money banks dominate the financial sector and account for 91% of transactions within 
the financial system, which is measured as percentage of total assets of deposit money banks to 
all financial institutions (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2014). In Zambia, banks dominate the 
financial landscape and account for more than 90% of total financial industry assets (Simpasa, 
2013). In Papua New Guinea, commercial banks dominate the financial sector and owe 68 
percent of total financial sector assets; the capital markets is shallow (Bank of Papua New 
Guinea, 2015). The case is rife in most resource-rich countries though in varying degrees. 
Banks accept deposits from individuals and institutions and intermediate funds from the surplus 
sector to the deficit sector of the economy. Though banks are subject to certain regulations by 
the regulatory authorities, financial intermediaries determine the rules for allocating funds, and 
thus play a significant role in determining the type of investment activities, the level of job 
creation and the distribution of income (Gross, 2001). The banking industry has changed 
significantly buoyed by competition, mergers and acquisitions, the advent of globalization, and 
the emergence of technological advances in information and communication technologies 
(Hawkins and Mihaljek, 2001). Banks in resource-rich countries are more liquid, more 
profitable, and better capitalised; sustained by resource revenues (Beck, 2011). However, they 
disburse less private credit than in most non-oil countries. For instance, bank private credit from 
2000-2012 on average in Azerbaijan and Nigeria were 12% and 19% of total GDP, respectively 
in oil-rich countries; while bank private credit in Tunisia and Bangladesh were 55% and 33% 
of total GDP, respectively in non-oil countries. In oil-rich Democratic Republic of Congo, over 
the same period, bank credit to the private sector accounts for less than 7% of GDP (WDI, 
2014). This is particularly surprising given the massive amount of excess liquidity (which is 
also evident in the relatively small bank credit to the private sector as a per cent of total banking 
assets) in the banking sector of oil-rich countries and reflects a weak level of financial 
intermediation. A low rate of expansion of the credit volume is not only a symptom of weak 
economic growth, but can also be one of its causes (Bundesbank, 2005)  
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Natural resource sectors have easier access to bank credit and other ways of accessing funds 
than the non-oil sectors. For that reason, the banking system may be more important for the 
non-natural resource sector than the natural resource sector. But banks are reluctant to hand out 
loans, especially in sectors of the economy outside natural resources. One of the explanations 
for the lack of export diversification in oil-rich countries is the presence of incomplete financial 
markets (Acemoglu and Ziblotti, 1997; DeRosa, 1992). For example, agriculture in Nigeria 
contributed 40% of GDP and 60 per cent of employment in 2013, but over a decade, the sector 
received an average of 3% of the total loans available in Nigerian banks (Central Bank of 
Nigeria, 2014). In Dem. Rep. of Congo, agriculture contributed 45% of GDP and over 60 per 
cent of employment in 2012, but over the decade, bank credit represents an average of 7% of 
total GDP and this was mainly given to the mining companies (African Development Bank, 
2013). It seems the non-oil sector receives disproportionate bank credit even though they 
contribute more to total GDP and this reflects a skewed level of financial intermediation. This 
could be fuelling the vicious cycle of a mono-product economy and export concentration 
inherent in oil-rich countries (Ledermand and Maloney, 2007). Does financial intermediation 
promote economic diversification? Economic diversification herein means developing the non-
oil sectors and reducing dependence on oil revenues (i.e., diversification of exports, government 
revenue, and economic base). For this reason, there is a need to appraise the influence of 
financial intermediaries on the growth of non-oil sector. 
More so, government domestic debt could be clogging the wheels of financial intermediation; 
increased government borrowing encourages banks to invest in government treasury bills as 
opposed to actual intermediation of funds to the private sector. Governments issue debt for two 
reasons. The first reason is about conducting monetary policy in which government bonds 
facilitate the pricing of corporate bonds and equities by providing a benchmark yield curve 
(Reinhart and Sack, 2000). The second reason is about balancing government budgets. The 
relationship between government debt and economic growth has been studied extensively by 
economists and policymakers without a clear consensus (Kumar and Woo, 2010; Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2010; Panizza and Presbitero, 2012; Herndon et al., 2013). The method of financing 
government expenditures plays a significant role in shaping budget deficits, and inflation – 
when central banks respond to higher deficits by increasing the growth of the money supply. 
The key outcomes from the literature indicate that both the method of financing the deficit (i.e. 
borrowing or printing money) and the components of government expenditures (i.e. 
consumption or investment) could have different effects on private investment and growth. The 
overall result from the empirical literature on the impact of government expenditure is 
ambiguous: most of the empirical studies find a significantly negative effect of government 
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consumption expenditure on growth, and a significantly positive effect of government 
investment expenditure on growth (Saleh, 2003)   
Governments in developing countries face extraordinary constraints in raising revenues given 
the policy instruments available are limited (Sah and Stiglitz, 1992). For example, high 
unemployment and low per capita income coupled with a large informal sector make it difficult 
to use income tax and indirect taxes to raise revenue (Paula De and Schienkman, 2007). 
Developing countries lost a significant and reliable source of income from tariffs due to trade 
liberalization, but failed to recoup the lost revenue through tax reform in the form of sales and 
value added tax. The reliance on inflation tax (when the government prints more money; it 
floods the market with cash, which raises inflation in the long-run and reduces the relative value 
of previous borrowing) is majorly discouraged in order to maintain macroeconomic stability. 
More so, access to international credit market is limited unlike the developed countries. 
Therefore the restricted sources of finance faced by governments in developing countries led 
them to borrow more from domestic markets and this borrowing has increased dramatically 
since the late 1990s (Emran and Farazi, 2009). For the oil-rich countries, government borrowing 
is fairly volatile which is associated with resource revenues.  
Banks are the major lenders to the government as the bond and equity markets are very much 
undeveloped. This could lead to crowding-out effect which occurs when increased government 
borrowing reduces private investment. The crowding-out effect occurs mainly through debt and 
tax channels as government expenditure is usually financed via increased taxes or greater 
government debt. In theory, higher taxes reduce disposable income, aggregate demand and 
private investment while increased government debt induces higher interest rates which reduces 
aggregate demand and private investment; however, government borrowing is often utilised 
than taxes in developing countries. Increased government domestic debt could affect interest 
rates but due to the limitations of the price mechanism to clear markets (which is more evident 
in developing countries) there may not be a significant relation between government borrowing 
and interest rates. For instance, banks might not increase the interest rate they charge even in 
the face of an excess demand for funds (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1992). More so, even if there is a 
significant relation between government debt and interest rates, this relation by itself provides 
little insight into the effect of government debt on economic quantities.  
The available evidence in the literature (mostly in developed countries) shows that the 
relationship between government borrowing and equilibrium interest rate (price channel) is 
ambiguous.  For example, in the U.S. alone, Gale and Orszag (2004) counted numerous studies 
that found significant positive effects of deficits on interest rates and similar amounts with no 
7 
 
positive effect. Given this heterogeneity in the empirical literature, it is easy to identify a large 
number of studies that support any preconceived stance. Most of the studies on the effect of 
government debts and deficits on interest rates are confined to the developed countries and there 
is paucity of studies on developing countries. The relationship between government borrowing 
and interest rate is assumed to be weak in developing countries because the financial sector has 
historically been subject to extensive government interventions and the interest rates have often 
been set administratively by the central bank. More so, even if the banking sector is liberalized, 
the effects of government borrowing are still mediated primarily through the credit availability 
(quantity channel), given that the bond markets are less developed and credit rationing is 
common (Emran and Farazi, 2009). Credit rationing occurs when banks limit the supply of 
additional credit to borrowers, even if the latter are willing to pay higher interest rates. This is 
an example of market imperfection as the price mechanism fails to bring about equilibrium in 
the market. 
However, contrary to popular belief that an administered interest rate in developing countries 
is insensitive to market perceptions, such a rate could accommodate market signals. Gupta 
(1984) suggests the inter-temporal movement of the interest rate and its variability should be 
examined. This is particularly true for developing countries which are moving towards market 
liberalization: low interest rates that provided cheap credit to the public sector have been 
drifting towards market-determined rates; gradual withdrawal of directed credit is making more 
financial resources available to the private sector; and the cautious elimination of policies that 
had constrained free and fair competition in the banking sectors is leading to increased and 
diversified development of financial institutions. In many developing countries, markets have 
started to play a visible role unlike in the past. Therefore, this could leave more scope for the 
functioning of the interest rate channel. Do government debts affect the equilibrium interest 
rate in oil-rich countries? If the interest rates are not determined by market clearing, then the 
availability of credit, the quantity channel could be more important in understanding the effects 
of government borrowing on private investment. Hence, there is a need to understand the 
mechanism and magnitude through which large public domestic debts may affect private 
investment and subsequently economic growth. 
1.2  Problem Statement  
Many oil-dependent countries are undergoing structural reforms towards improving economic 
performance, and diversifying the economy in particular, however, there is a lack of 
understanding with regards to the main drivers of diversification (Agosin et al., 2011). One 
potential determinant is financial intermediation; banks intermediate funds and thus reduce 
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financing constraints, which plays a crucial role in expanding economic activities, enhancing 
efficiency and productivity, and inducing economic growth. International institutions continue 
to persuade oil-rich countries to implement policies towards more liberalised financial system 
to support access to finance for the financially constrained sectors. For example, the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa (2006) argues that the lack of development in the 
financial markets is a key reason for the limited economic diversification in resource-rich 
African countries. However, despite government efforts, progress to diversify the economy 
away from oil has been modest. The non-oil sector is the major driver of the economy; it is a 
labour intensive industry and generates more employment than the resource sector. The oil-
sector is highly capital-intensive, as a result, it neither creates many jobs nor contributes 
significantly to employment, and its operations have fewer linkages to the rest of the economy. 
The non-oil sector is a key driver of economic diversification, and the performance of this sector 
can be used to gauge the effectiveness of macroeconomic and financial sector policies; these 
policies are judged to be successful if they promote real sector activities and raise societal 
welfare. The development of the private sector depends on the availability of private sector 
credit, however, bank credit to the private sector  in oil-dependent countries is relatively low 
even though the banks are more liquid, better capitalised, and more profitable (Beck, 2011). Do 
bank credits stimulate growth in the non-oil sector?  
Banks are more liquid, better capitalised, and more profitable in resource-rich countries, but 
lending to the private sector is relatively low as a percentage of total GDP.  The lower level of 
bank credit to the private sector has often been blamed, amongst other reasons, on governments 
increasing reliance on the banking sector to finance budget deficits. In countries where domestic 
banks mostly finance the public sector, the private sector experiences problems in finding credit 
for its investment and this undermines economic growth. The effects of government borrowing 
can operate through different channels; however, many of the concerns have focused on the 
potential interest rate effect. Government borrowing can affect private investment by crowding 
out private sector credit directly (real crowding out), or indirectly through rising interest rates 
(financial crowding out), though the magnitude of these potentially adverse consequences 
depends on the degree to which government borrowing raises interest rates and/or reduces 
private credit (Engen and Hubbard, 2004). The analysis of the effects of government borrowing 
on private investment has been ongoing for more than three decades and empirical consensus 
about the transmission mechanism and magnitude differs given economic structure and 
regulatory constraints. The oil-rich countries have taken advantage of the commodity boom in 
the last decade to reduce public external debt but domestic borrowing from banks has not 
decreased accordingly. Does government borrowing from domestic banks qualitatively drive 
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up interest rates, or quantitatively shrink private sector credit and thus contribute to the low 
level of private credit in oil-rich countries? 
1.3   Research Questions 
1)  Does bank credit promote non-oil economic growth? 
 
  2)  What are the drivers of non-hydrocarbon output growth?  
3)   Does government borrowing from domestic banks drive up interest rates, or shrink private    
      sector credit?   
  
  4)  What are the determinants of private sector credit? 
 
1.4  Objectives of the Study 
The objectives of this study are: 
1)  To investigate the impact of financial intermediaries in promoting economic  
     diversification in oil-dependent countries. 
  2)  To examine the determinants of non-hydrocarbon output growth in oil-dependent countries. 
 
  3)   To investigate whether government domestic borrowing hampers private sector credit and to 
      ascertain the transmission mechanism in oil-dependent countries. 
4)  To explore the determinants of private sector credit in oil-dependent countries. 
 
1.5  Significance of the Study 
Banks dominate the financial systems in resource-rich countries. Banks promote economic 
growth and development through the process of intermediation by efficiently allocating funds 
mobilized from the surplus economic units to deficits units. This function suggests that financial 
intermediation serves as a catalyst for economic growth and development. 
Liberalization of the financial sector (with an adequate institutional framework) allows 
financial deepening– which reflects an increasing use of financial intermediation by savers and 
borrowers and allows an efficient flow of resources among people and institutions over time. 
This encourages savings and reduces constraints on capital accumulation and improves 
allocative efficiency of investment by transferring capital from less productive to more 
productive sectors. The efficiency as well as the level of investment are thus expected to rise 
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with the financial development that liberalization promotes (McKinnon, 1973). Therefore, 
easing of credit constraints will help reduce the gap between actual and potential outputs. The 
development of the financial system facilitates portfolio diversification for savers, which 
reduces risk and offers more choices to investors seeking increasing returns. Another important 
function of the financial system is to collect and process information on investment projects in 
a cost effective manner which reduces the cost of investment for individual investors (King & 
Levine, 1993).  
This study is important because there is a need to move away from the present monolithic 
economy and diversify a country’s economic base away from natural resources and explore 
other sources of revenue which would promote economic growth and development and help 
reduce the high rate of unemployment persistent in most resource-rich countries. The role of 
the non-oil sector is paramount and the performance of this sector can be used to gauge the 
effectiveness of macroeconomic policies and specifically financial sector policies. These 
policies are judged to be successful if they promote the production and distribution of goods 
and services that raise the societal welfare because vibrant real sector activities create more 
linkages in the economy than any other sector. 
The high dependency on natural resources, particularly hydrocarbons, combined with the 
volatile price made the revenues and spending of resource-rich countries more volatile than 
non-natural resource countries. Volatility has negative effects on the macroeconomic level, 
productivity growth, and the rate of private sector investment (Addison, 2008). Therefore, 
diversifying the economy away from hydrocarbons or expanding the traditional non-
hydrocarbon exports will help reduce volatility. 
As government revenues is strongly associated with the price of natural resource, a negative 
shock could trigger low growth, or in some cases negative growth and with a high interest rate, 
financing debt becomes more expensive and may further drain credit from the private sector. 
In short, high debt makes public finances more vulnerable to future shocks, both by constraining 
the ability of governments to engage in countercyclical policies and by increasing the primary 
surplus needed to stabilize the debt ratio following an adverse shock to growth (Abbas et al., 
2013). Expanding the traditional non-hydrocarbon sector would help dampen the impact of 
external events and foster more robust and resilient growth. 
The private sector development is widely recognized by the international community as an 
engine of sustainable and inclusive growth, an avenue to reduce poverty. Thus, the way forward 
is to encourage private investment, which depends on the availability of private sector credit. 
Given that the capital market is not well-developed and the informal finance sector is limited, 
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identifying the effectiveness of banks in allocating funds mobilized from the surplus economic 
units to deficits units will help ameliorate impediments to intermediation.  
This research study is important to examine the crowding out effects of government domestic 
borrowing on private sector credit and the effectiveness of private credit in promoting the 
growth of the emerging non-oil sector. This is because financial sector development is essential 
in mobilizing private sector credit to fund non-oil sector-led economic diversification as well 
as in providing a greater range of high-quality financial services (Cevik and Rahmati, 2013). 
The growth of the non-oil sector and thus a diversified economy is crucial to the creation of a 
more inclusive, resilient and sustainable economy. 
1.6 Organisation of the Study 
The rest of this study is structured into four chapters. Chapter 2 introduces the theoretical 
foundation and empirical studies of this study. Chapter 3 describes the data and methodology. 
Chapter 4 presents and discusses the result of the analysis. Chapter 5 provides the conclusion, 
policy implications, and limitations of the study. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
 
2.1 Financial development 
2.1.2 Finance and growth 
The endogenous growth theory postulates that the long-run growth rate of an economy is 
primarily the result of endogenous factors such as policy measures, human capital, 
technological innovation, and not external forces. Financial development is a potential source 
of long-run economic growth. McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) expound that countries with 
sustained economic growth tend to have developed financial sectors and, in those countries, 
developed financial systems lead to higher economic growth by increasing the size of savings 
and improving the efficiency of investments. Bencivenga and Smith (1991) argue that financial 
intermediaries reduce the amount of savings held in the form of unproductive liquid assets and 
prevent misallocations of capital due to liquidity needs. Levine (1997) claims that financial 
systems influence growth by easing information and transaction costs, exerting corporate 
governance, supporting resource mobilization, promoting financial exchanges, strengthening 
information about possible investments, allocating capital accordingly, monitoring 
investments, facilitating the trading, diversification, and management of risk, mobilizing and 
pooling savings, and easing the exchange of goods and services. Ngai (2005) emphasizes the 
specific role of bank credit to the private sector in stimulating economic growth and as the most 
important source of financing for firms, especially in countries where capital markets are 
underdeveloped. Plamen and Khamis (2009) assert that bank credit enables firms to undertake 
investments that they would not make with their own funds, and hence as credit availability 
increases, consumption and investment expenditures increase and this promotes economic 
growth.  
Financial development and economic growth nexus has four hypotheses. The first hypothesis 
is that financial development is supply–leading, in the sense that financial development is a 
causal factor for economic growth. One of the early contributors was Schumpeter (1911) who 
argued that the services provided by financial intermediaries encourage technological 
innovation and economic growth. This was further explored in the pioneering work of 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) which emphasised the importance of having a banking 
system free from financial restrictions such as interest rate ceilings, high reserve requirements 
13 
 
and directed credit programs. They argued that financial repression disrupts both savings and 
investment, while the liberalization of the financial system allows financial deepening and 
increases the competition in the financial sector which in turn promotes economic growth.  
The second hypothesis is that financial development is demand–following. In contrast to 
supply–leading, Robinson (1952) argued that financial development follows economic growth; 
as an economy develops, the demand for financial services increases and as a result more 
financial institutions, financial instruments and services appear in the market. A similar view 
was expressed by Kuznets (1955) who suggested that as an economy expands and approaches 
the intermediate growth stage, the demand for financial services begins to increase. This 
hypothesis postulates that economic growth is a causal factor for financial development because 
growth in the real sector stimulates the financial sector, that is, economic activities propel banks 
to finance enterprises, thus, where enterprises lead, finance follows (Gurley & Shaw, 1967).  
The third hypothesis is that financial development is bi-directional. In other words, there is a 
mutual causal relationship between financial development and economic growth. This 
argument was put forward by Patrick (1966) who showed that given the level of economic 
development, there is a bidirectional causality between economic growth and financial 
development. Greenwood and Jonaviich (1990) supported this view by arguing that economic 
growth provides means for development in the financial sector and the financial sector in turns 
foster growth by allowing more savings and investment. Harrison et al. (1999) constructed a 
model in which causality runs both ways between economic growth and financial sector 
development. They argued that economic growth increases banking activity and profits, this 
promotes the entry of more banks and, as a result, the greater availability of banking services 
reduces the non-physical and physical distance between banks and clients, which in turn, lowers 
transaction costs and enriches economic growth. 
The fourth hypothesis is that financial development and economic growth are not causally 
related. According to this hypothesis, there is no relationship between finance and growth. In 
other words, financial development does not cause growth or vice versa. This view was put 
forward by Lucas (1988) who said that economists place excessive emphasis on the role of 
financial factors in economic growth. Some frameworks equally highlighted the potential 
negative impact of finance on growth (De Gregorio and Guidotti, 1995; Loayza & Ranciere, 
2004). They argued that high levels of liberalization of the financial sector (financial deepening) 
may shrink the total real credit to domestic firms which in turn lowers investment and slows 
economic growth.  
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2.1.3 Finance and economic diversification 
Financial development is a source for comparative advantage (Kletzer and Bardhan, 1987). 
Countries with identical technology and endowments with no economies of scale could face 
different production costs; moral hazard issues in the international credit market under 
sovereign risk and imperfect information in the domestic institutions may lead some countries 
or firms to face higher interest rates or more credit rationing. This results in differences in 
comparative advantages in working capital, trade finance and marketing costs. 
Beck (2002) shows that countries with well-developed financial systems tend to specialise in 
sectors with increasing returns. The model presents an open economy with two production 
technologies: the manufacturing (increasing returns to scale) and food (constant returns to 
scale). In this model, financial development is assumed to lower the search cost, increase 
external finance and encourage the production of goods with increasing returns to scale. The 
model predicts that economies with more developed financial systems are more likely to be net 
exporters of manufacturing products. Thus, the development of the financial system could lead 
to greater export diversification in resource-rich countries. 
Industries that rely on external finance seems to gain more from financial development (Rajan 
and Zangales, 1998). The model considers the dependence on external finance of firms in the 
US as a proxy for other countries. Following Rajan and Zangales (1998), export diversification 
in resource-rich countries could benefit from financial development if the oil and mineral 
industries have relatively lower external finance dependence. If this is the case, then non-natural 
resource industries might benefit more from financial development; then it can be argued that 
financial development could help resource-rich countries to push their exports away from 
primary products and thus to greater economic diversification. Table (2.1) shows the external 
finance dependence for oil and mineral sectors, according to their index; the higher ratio means 
greater external financial dependence.  
Table 2.1: External finance dependence for oil and mineral sectors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Rajan and Zangales (1998) 
Industrial sectors External finance dependence 
Non-ferrous metal  0.01 
Petroleum refineries 0.04 
Non-metal products 0.06 
Iron and steel 0.09 
Metal products 0.23 
Petroleum and  coal products 0.33 
Drugs 1.49 
Plastic sectors 1.19 
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2.1.4 Empirical studies 
There is plethora of empirical literature on the finance-growth nexus. Most of the pioneering 
studies (e.g. King and Levine, 1993; Levine, 1997; Levine et al., 2000; Beck et al., 2000) show 
that the level of financial development is a good predictor of future rates of economic growth, 
capital accumulation, and technological change. The importance of financial institutions in 
promoting economic growth seems somewhat irrefutable, however, what seems very 
contestable is the nature and direction of causality.  
The empirical study of Goldsmith (1969), one of the leaders of the view that financial 
intermediation promotes economic growth, assumed that there is a positive correlation between 
the size of financial systems and the supply of financial services. The author examines the 
relationship between the financial institutions’ assets and GDP per capita growth using data of 
35 countries over the period 1860-1963. Goldsmith found that banks and non-bank financial 
institutions develop as the economy grows and the author concludes that there is a positive link 
between financial development and economic growth. However, the author was unable to draw 
causal inferences.   
King and Levine (1993) examined the data of 80 countries with pooled cross-country, time- 
series over the period 1960-1989. They found that various measures of financial development 
such as the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP, credit issued to nonfinancial private firms divided 
by total credit, and credit issued to nonfinancial private firms divided by GPP were strongly 
associated with real per capita GDP growth. The authors conclude that the level of financial 
intermediation was a good predictor of long-run rates of economic growth, capital 
accumulation, and productivity improvements. However, they were also unwilling to draw 
causal inferences. Deidda and Fattouh (2002) examined the dataset of King and Levine (1993) 
with a pooled cross-country, time-series and separated high- and low-income countries. The 
authors conclude that in low income countries, there was no significant relationship between 
financial development and growth, whereas in high income countries, this relationship was 
positively significant. 
While previous studies opine that the level of financial development is a good predictor of 
future rates of economic growth, they did not discuss the issue of causality. Rousseau and 
Wachtel (1998) examined the links between financial intermediation and economic growth in 
five industrialised countries in the period 1870-1929 using the Vector Error Correction Models 
(VECMs) and the Granger Causality test. They found that finance leads growth in real sector 
activity.  
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Levine et al. (2000) extended the study of King and Levine (1993). They used credit to private 
firms as a measure of bank development with GMM dynamic panel estimators and a cross-
sectional instrumental variable estimator to address the potential biases induced by 
simultaneity, omitted variables, and unobserved country-specific effects. The authors conclude 
that the exogenous components of financial intermediation are positively related to economic 
growth.  
Beck et al. (2000) used both the cross-sectional instrumental variable estimator and the system 
GMM dynamic panel estimator to improve their pure cross-country study; in other words, to 
extract the exogenous component of financial intermediary development and to control for 
biases associated with simultaneity and unobserved country-specific effects. The authors found 
that higher levels of financial intermediation produce faster rates of economic growth. They 
conclude that there is a positive link between the level of financial intermediaries and real GDP 
per capita growth.  
Chistopoulos and Tsionas (2004) had some reservations on previous studies that did not 
consider cointegration properties of data. They investigate the long-run relationship between 
financial intermediation and economic growth using the fully modified OLS, panel unit root 
tests and panel cointegration analysis for 10 developing countries. The authors conclude that 
there exists a uni-directional causality from finance to growth. 
Rioja and Valev (2004) suggest that the relationship between financial development and 
economic growth may vary according to the level of financial development of countries. They 
used dynamic panel data techniques and divided their sample into three regions and found that 
in the low-income countries with very low levels of financial development, additional 
improvements in financial markets has an uncertain effect on growth, in the middle-income 
countries, financial development has a large and positive effect on growth, and in the high-
income countries, the effect was positive, but smaller. Hassan et al. (2011) examined the role 
of financial development in economic growth for low- and middle-income countries from 1980-
2007 with vector autoregressive (VAR) models, weighted least square and the pooled data 
regressions.  They found a positive relationship between financial development and economic 
growth in developing countries. But the direction of causality has mixed results: a two-way 
causal link between finance and growth for most regions, and a one-way causality from growth 
to finance for the poorest region.  
Caporale et al. (2009) used a dynamic panel GMM technique to study the relationship between 
financial development and economic growth for ten new EU members. They conclude that the 
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stock and credit markets are underdeveloped and lack the financial depth to contribute to 
economic growth. 
Demetriades and James (2011) utilized the panel cointegration methods to examine the link 
between bank credit and economic growth for 18 countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Their 
findings suggest that banking system development in the region follows economic growth.  The 
authors conclude that there was no link between bank credit and economic growth.  
Jun (2012) employ panel cointegration approach to investigate the relationship between 
financial development proxies and output growth for a panel of 27 Asian countries over the 
period 1960-2009. The author found a statistically significant positive bi-directional 
cointegration relationship between financial development and output growth. In other words, 
financial market development promotes output growth and in turn output growth stimulates 
further financial development. 
Pradhan et al. (2013) employ a panel cointegration technique to examine the financial 
development-economic growth nexus for BRICS countries by constructing a composite index 
for financial development with the help of principal component analysis. They conclude that 
financial development and economic growth are cointegrated and there exist a bi-directional 
causality between them. 
Rioja and Valev (2014) examine the effect of banks and stock markets on the sources of 
economic growth using a dynamic panel GMM technique for a set of 62 developed and 
developing countries. Their results show that stock markets do not have any significant effect 
on source of economic growth for developing countries whereas banks have a sizable growth 
effects. However, in case of developed countries they find stock markets to have a positive 
growth effects. 
Time-series analysis have also been used extensively with vector autoregressive (VAR) models 
and vector error correction models (VECM). Most of the studies conclude that the causal 
relationship between financial development and economic growth is unidirectional, 
bidirectional or there is no causal relationship between these variables1.  The outcomes depend 
on the selected countries, the period under examination and the financial development 
indicators used for the analysis. For example, Hansson and Jonung (1997) examined the long-
run relationship between the volume of credit and level of GDP in Sweden from 1830 to the 
1990. They found that prior to World War 11, the financial system had the most impact on 
                                                          
1Odedokun (1989) for Nigeria; Lyons and Murinde (1994) for Ghana; Wood (1993) for Barbados; Ford (1998) for 
Indonesia; Khan, et al. (2005) for Pakistan; Majid (2007) for Thailand; Mohamad (2008) for Sudan; Abu- Bader, 
et al. (2008) for Egypt; Singh (2008) for India; Safdari et al. (2011) for Iran. 
18 
 
GDP, and conclude that the role of the financial system in promoting growth is more significant 
during the intermediate stages of economic development. Fase (2001) appraised the relationship 
between financial development and economic growth in Netherlands between 1900 and 2000. 
The author found that causality runs from financial intermediation to economic growth until 
World War 11 and disappears afterwards. The author conclude that the development of the 
financial system has a greater impact on growth in developing countries than in the developed 
economies. A study by Shan et al. (2006) explored the relationship between financial 
development and economic growth in China and they not only found bidirectional causality 
between financial development and economic growth but also that the Granger causality of 
economic growth to financial development was stronger than that from finance to growth.  Ang 
and McKibbin (2007) assessed whether financial development leads to economic growth or 
vice versa in Malaysia using data from 1960 to 2001 with cointegration and causality tests 
taking savings, investment, trade and real interest rate into account. The results support the view 
that output growth causes financial depth in the long-run. The authors conclude that the reasons 
finance follows growth is because the returns from financial development depend on the 
mobilization of savings and allocation of funds to productive investment projects but due to 
information gaps, high transaction costs and misallocation of resources, the interaction between 
savings and investment and its link with economic growth is not strong in developing countries. 
In resource-rich countries which is the focus of our study, Gylfason and Zoega (2001) used 
cross-country OLS regression analysis across 85 countries from 1965 to 1998 and found that 
natural capital crowds out physical and human capital, thereby hindering economic growth. 
Their results suggest that across countries, heavy dependence on natural resources hurts savings 
and investment indirectly by restraining the development of the financial system. However, the 
cross-sectional analysis of this study did not address the problems of omitted variables bias that 
is prevalent in growth models. Our research study uses an improved methodology that addresses 
the above-stated problems. 
Nili and Rastad (2007) applied a dynamic panel estimation technique (GMM) to examine the 
effects of financial development on economic growth on 12 oil-exporting countries from 1975-
2000. They find a lower level of financial development for the oil-based economies than the 
rest of the world; a higher rate of investment in the oil-based economies is explained mainly by 
the oil, and that the weakness of financial institutions is associated with the poor performance 
of the private sector. The reservation with this study is the sample; the 12 oil-exporting countries 
is relatively small since there are more than 25 oil-exporting countries. Second, their findings 
may be attributed to the fact that during the period under analysis, the financial sector was still 
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relatively under-developed because measures of financial development such as bank credit have 
increased tremendously since the year 2000. Third, while their methodology addressed the 
problems associated with growth models, the authors did not disentangle the impact of financial 
development in the oil and non-oil sectors of the sample countries. Our study addresses the 
afore-said downsides. 
Beck (2011) tested the relationship between financial development and economic growth in 
resource-rich economies using cross-country regression analysis. The author found that the 
finance and growth relationship is important in resource-based economies as in other 
economies. But firms in resource-based economies use less external finance and a smaller 
proportion use bank loans, although the level of demand is similar to other countries, thus 
pointing to supply constraints. Beck conclude that there is some indication of a natural resource 
curse in financial development. The drawback with this study is that it is not clear which sector 
of the economy has fewer or severe finance supply constraints because such constraints would 
not be the same for the different sectors of the economies.  
Al-Malikawi et al. (2012) examined the relationship between financial development and 
economic growth in a panel dataset of thirteen Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) 
countries for the period 1985-2005 using pooled OLS regression and a fixed effect model. Their 
result suggests the relationship between financial development and economic growth is positive 
and concludes that financial development plays an important role in economic growth. 
However, it would be more informative if the hydrocarbon and non-hydrocarbon sectors were 
separated to give a better insight into the effects of financial development on economic growth 
since the two sectors are markedly different. Our study improves on this and addresses the 
problems of endogeneity that is prevalent in pooled OLS regression and fixed effect models. 
Barajas et al. (2013) used a dynamic panel estimation technique (GMM) for 150 countries over 
the period 1975–2005 and conclude that the beneficial effect of financial deepening on 
economic growth displays measurable heterogeneity; it is smaller in oil exporting countries and 
in lower-income countries and the differences are driven by regulatory/supervisory 
characteristics and differences in the ability to provide widespread access to financial services. 
Hasanov and Huseynov (2013) examined the impact of bank credits on the non-oil tradable 
sector output in Azerbaijan based on the ARDL Bounds Testing approach, Engle-Granger two-
step methodology, and Johansen's approach. Results from the three approaches indicate that 
bank credits have a positive impact on non-oil tradable sectors’ output both in the long- and 
short-run.  
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Cevik and Rahmati (2013) investigated the causal relationship between financial development 
and economic growth in Libya during the period 1970–2010. The OLS estimation shows that 
financial development has a statistically significant negative effect on real non-hydrocarbon 
GDP per capita growth. However, the VAR-based estimations present statistically insignificant 
results, albeit still attaching negative coefficient to financial intermediation. The authors 
conclude that non-hydrocarbon economic activity depends largely on government spending 
which is determined by the country’s hydrocarbon earnings.  
Samargandi et al. (2014) explore the effect of financial development on economic growth in 
the context of an oil-rich economy– Saudi Arabia. They allowed for the effect of financial 
development to be different for the oil and non-oil sectors of the economy in the long-run using 
the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) bounds test technique. The authors found that 
financial development has a positive impact on the growth of the non-oil sector in Saudi Arabia. 
In contrast, its impact on total GDP growth is negative but insignificant.  
Mirzaei and Moore (2015) examined the effect of bank performance on the non-oil industry 
sectors in Qatar over the period 2000–2006. The authors conclude that the quantity of finance 
does not seem to matter for industry growth but rather a competitive, efficient and stable 
banking system enhances financially-dependent industries to grow faster. 
This study differs from the existing empirical studies in several ways: other empirical studies 
are country-specific cases; most estimates are obtained with relatively small samples and, as 
such, inference may be unreliable. The research study avoid this problems by combining the 
time series and the cross sectional dimensions of the data resulting in more observations; this 
generates remarkable improvements in the reliability of statistical inference. We circumvent the 
limitations of conventional panel cointegration methods by allowing for cross-country 
dependence. Moreover, we make provisions for short-run and long-run estimates. This study 
investigates the role of finance in promoting non-oil economic growth using panel cointegration 
approach and pooled mean group estimator in a dynamic heterogeneous panel setting. This 
study contributes to the literature on the role of finance in resource-rich economies. 
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Table 2.2 Literature Review for Oil-Exporting Countries   
 
No Topic Country/Region Model/Variables Main Findings 
1 Addressing the growth 
failure of the oil economies: 
The role of financial 
development (Nili and 
Rastad, 2007) 
 
Oil exporting countries 
(1975-2000) 
GMM (M2, bank credit 
to private sector to 
GDP, liquid liabilities 
to GDP, total deposit to 
GDP, stock market 
capital to GDP, etc.)  
The findings of this 
paper report a lower 
level of financial 
development for the 
oil-economies 
compared with the rest 
of the world. 
 
2 Natural resources, 
education, and economic 
development (Gylfason, 
2001) 
Across 85 countries 
(1965-1998) with 
emphasis in oil- 
exporting countries. 
OLS (Natural capital, 
investment, enrolment 
rate, initial income and 
economic growth, etc.) 
Natural capital appears 
to crowd out human 
capital, thereby 
slowing down the pace 
of economic 
development. 
 
3 Finance and Oil. Is there a 
Resource Curse in Financial 
Development? (Beck, 2011)  
Resource-based 
economies (1970-2007) 
Fixed-effect (GDP per 
capita, private credit, 
natural resource 
exports, trade, inflation, 
real exchange rate, 
fixed assets,  
government 
consumption, liquid 
liabilities, initial GDP 
per capita, etc.) 
Banks are more liquid, 
better capitalized and 
more profitable, but 
give fewer loans to 
firms. Overall, there is 
some indication of a 
natural resource curse 
in financial 
development, which 
falls more on 
enterprises than on 
households.  
 
4 Finance-Growth Nexus: 
Evidence from a Panel of 
MENA Countries (Al-
Malkawi et al., 2012)  
Thirteen Middle Eastern 
and North African 
(MENA) countries for 
the period 1985-2005) 
Pooled OLS regression 
and a fixed and random 
effect model (real GDP 
growth, domestic credit 
to private sector, 
government 
expenditure, trade 
openness, inflation, 
etc.)  
 
The relationship 
between financial 
development and 
economic growth is 
positive and that 
financial development 
played an important 
role in economic 
growth. 
5 Financial development and 
economic growth in an oil-
rich economy: The case of 
Saudi Arabia (Samargandi, 
Fidrmuc and Ghosh, 2014) 
 
Saudi Arabia (1968-
2010) 
Autoregressive 
Distributed Lag 
(ARDL) Bounds test 
technique (Real GDP 
per capita, private 
credit, oil price, trade 
openness, non-oil GDP 
per capita, etc.) 
 
 
Financial development 
has a positive impact 
on the growth of the 
non-oil sector but its 
impact on the oil-sector 
growth and total GDP 
growth is either 
negative or 
insignificant.  
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2.2 Government Debt and Crowding-Out Effect 
2.2.1 The interest rate channel 
The literature identifies two variants of crowding out in an economy: real and financial (Blinder 
and Solow, 1973). The real crowding out occurs when the increase in public investment 
displaces private capital formation, which is also called direct crowding out. Direct crowding 
out refers to the substitution relationship between public and private spending that occurs not 
through changes in prices, interest rates, or required rate of returns in the public sector, but 
through the public sector consumption and investment (Buiter, 1990, p. 34). On the other hand, 
the phenomenon of partial loss of private capital formation in the economy due to increase in 
the interest rates emanating from the pre-emption of financial resources by the government 
through bond-financing of fiscal deficit, is termed financial crowding out, which is also known 
as indirect crowding out. Indirect crowding out is the consequences of public actions that affect 
private behaviour either by altering the budget constraints or by influencing the prices faced by 
private agents through the interest rate 
The standard benchmark for understanding the potential effect of changes in government 
borrowing on interest rates is a model based on an aggregate production function for the 
6 The Finance and Growth 
Nexus Re-examined: Do 
All Countries Benefit 
Equally? (Barajas, A., R. 
Chami and S.R. Yousefi, 
2013) 
150 countries (1975-
2005) with emphasis in 
oil-exporting countries. 
OLS and GMM (private 
credit, bank deposits, 
liquid liabilities, market 
capitalisation, GDP, 
growth, non-oil GDP, 
education, FDI, oil, 
etc.) 
The beneficial effect of 
financial deepening on 
economic growth 
displays measurable 
heterogeneity; it is 
generally smaller in oil 
exporting countries; in 
certain regions, such as 
the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA); 
and in lower-income 
countries.  
 
7 Bank credits and non-oil 
economic growth: Evidence 
from Azerbaijan (Hasanov 
and Huseynov, 2013) 
Azerbaijan (2000-2010)  ARDL Bounds Testing 
approach, Engle–
Granger two-step 
methodology, and 
Johansen's approach. 
 
Bank credits have a 
positive impact on non-
oil tradable sector 
output both in the long-
and short-run. 
8 Searching for the Finance-
Growth Nexus in Libya 
(Cevik and Rahmati, 2013)  
 
Libya ( 1970-2010) OLS and VAR-based 
estimations 
(nonhydrocarbon GDP 
per capita growth, 
government spending, 
price of crude, etc.) 
 
Financial development 
has a statistically 
significant negative 
effect on real non-
hydrocarbon GDP per 
capita growth. 
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economy in which government debt crowds out productive physical capital.2  In this simple 
model; interest rate (r) determined by the marginal product of capital (MPK), would increase if 
capital (K) decreased, or was crowded out, by government debt (D). The Cobb-Douglas 
production function is given as: 
                                                 𝑌 = 𝐴𝐾𝜎𝐿(1−𝜎)                                                                             (2.1) 
 
Where L denotes labour units, A is the coefficient for multifactor productivity, and 𝜎 is the 
coefficient on capital in the production function, then the total return to capital in the economy 
(MPK*K) as a share of output (Y) equals: 
 
                                            𝜎  = (MPK×K)/Y.  
 
The interest rate is determined by:   
 
                                             r = MPK = 𝜎 × (Y/K) = 𝜎 × A × (𝐿/𝐾)1−𝜎 
 
 If government debt completely crowds out capital, so that ∂K/∂D = -1, then an exogenous increase in 
government debt (holding other factors constant) causes the interest rate to increase:  
                         ∂r/∂D = (∂r/∂K)(∂K/∂D) =  𝜎 × (1-  𝜎) × (Y/𝐾2) > 0 
 
                                         (Because 0< 𝜎 <1 and Y, K >0) 
Here, the level of the interest rate is determined by the level of the capital stock and, thus, by 
the level of government debt. It is the change in the interest rate that is affected by the change 
in government debt.  
Economists view the aggregate effect of government borrowing on interest rates from three 
perspectives (Bahmani-Oskooee, 1999). First, the Neoclassical School which advocates 
crowding-out believes that the determination of prices, outputs, and income distributions in 
markets is through supply and demand, often mediated through a maximization of utility by 
income-constrained individuals and of profits by cost-constrained firms employing available 
information and factors of production, in accordance with rational choice theory 
(Antonietta,1987, p. 323). It encompasses the neo-classical theory of interest rates which 
                                                          
2 See Ball and Mankiw (1995), Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999) 
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explains that the balancing of savings and investment is achieved by the interest rate 
mechanism. Thus, fluctuations in the rates of interest arise from variations either in the demand 
for loans or in the supply of loans. In the case of an increase in government debt, interest rates 
have to increase to bring the market into equilibrium, hence dampening private investment 
(Voss, 2002; Ganelli, 2003). Financing a budget deficit by borrowing from the public implies 
an increase in the supply of government bonds and, in order to improve the attractiveness of 
these bonds, the government offers them at a lower price which leads to higher interest rates. 
The increase in interest rates discourages the issue of private bonds and private spending. In 
turn, this results in the crowding out of private investment (Premchand, 1984) 
Second, the Keynesian model which supports crowding-in believes that private sector decisions 
sometimes lead to inefficient macroeconomic outcomes and require active policy responses by 
the public sector, in particular, fiscal policy actions by the government, in order to stabilize 
output over the business cycle (Blinder, 2008). It assumes that there is usually unemployment 
in the economy and that the interest rate sensitivity of investment is low. Therefore, 
expansionary fiscal policy will lead to little or no increase in the interest rate and instead an 
increase in output and income. Hence, there is crowding-in rather than crowding-out (Aschauer, 
1989; Baldacci, et al., 2004). Inspired by the work of Barro (1991), a number of studies (such 
as Oshikoya, 1994; Serven, 1996; Odedokun, 1997; Ahmed and Miller, 2000; Pereira, 2000; 
Saleh, 2003) argue that some public investments could be conducive to private investment and 
growth by raising the return to private capital. For example, public capital, particularly 
infrastructure capital, such as water systems, sewers, airports, roads and transport, power 
projects, expenditures on research, and education outlays are likely to exhibit a complementary 
relationship with private capital. Hence, higher public investment may raise the marginal 
productivity of private capital and, thereby, ‘crowd-in’ private investment. 
Third, the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem proposed by Barro (1974) advocates neutrality 
whereby increases in the deficit financed by fiscal spending will be matched with a future 
increase in taxes leaving interest rates and private investment unchanged. This view assumes 
that asset holders completely discount future tax liabilities implied in the deficits, which implies 
that budget deficits are irrelevant for financial decisions. In other words, a deficit induced by a 
lump-sum tax cut today followed by a lump-sum tax increase in the future will be fully offset 
by an increase in private savings, as taxpayers recognize that the tax is merely postponed, not 
cancelled. The offsetting increase in private savings means that the deficit would have no effect 
on national savings, interest rates, exchange rates, future domestic production, or future national 
income (Gale and Orszag, 2004). A similar view is found in the Capital Inflow Hypothesis 
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which is based on the idea that the demand for government debt is infinitely elastic (Dwyer, 
1985). That is, an increase in the deficit will be financed partly or wholly not by domestic 
savings but by an inflow of capital from abroad. If the hypothesis holds, interest rates could 
remain unchanged.  
2.2.2 The Credit Channel 
In principle, government borrowing affects private investment through the lending rate, 
however in financially repressed economies, particularly in many developing countries, the 
equilibrium interest rate could be somewhat insensitive to market perceptions. Financial 
repressions are measures that governments employ to channel funds to themselves, which in a 
deregulated market would go elsewhere. Government debt could still have no effect on interest 
rates but have a significant effect on private credit due to intervention by the government, such 
as administrative controls imposed on interest rates; a high legal reserve ratio; the existence of 
direct intervention on credit allocation; government ownership or control of domestic banks 
and financial institutions; and barriers that limit other institutions seeking to enter the market 
(Reinhart and Sbrancia, 2011). With the existence of these ‘artificial’ constraints, financial 
institutions will not take risks because higher interest rates cannot be charged which results in 
many high-yielding projects facing credit rationing (Fry, 1988, p. 18).  Hence, private credit 
will not be allocated according to the expected returns on the projects, but according to the 
quality of collateral, loan size, political pressure, and covert benefits to loan officers (King & 
Levine, 1993, p. 31). The credit rationing behaviour of banks could also be a result of the 
weakness of the legal institutions in enforcing contracts (Porta et al., 1998; Levine et al., 2000). 
In this case, interest rate variability will have no or at best a weak relationship with government 
borrowing. Thus, if the interest rate channel is weak, the quantity channel will capture the 
effects of government borrowing. 
Consequently, the degree of quantitative crowding out depends on the nature of the endogenous 
response of the banks to higher government borrowing and how they alter their balance sheets. 
Banks respond to higher government borrowing by adjusting their loan portfolio optimally 
given the risk-return characteristics of different assets and liabilities (Emran and Farazi, 2009). 
First, if banks have excess liquidity, a higher lending to the government may not result in any 
significant reduction of credit to the private sector. Secondly, access to safe government assets 
could allow the banks to take more risk and thus increase their lending to the private sector 
which is known as the ‘safe asset model’ of which without the availability of public debt, 
borrowers would face higher borrowing costs (Kumhof and Tanner, 2005). Such endogenous 
response by banks will ‘crowd-in’ private credit or partially offset the traditional crowding-out 
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effect. The third is the ‘lazy bank model’ which posits that a high degree of lending to the 
government may discourage banks from lending to the risky private sector and thus stifle their 
incentives to seek out new profitable investment opportunities in the private sector (Hauner, 
2009). For instance, Ghana has been offering an interest rate of over 15 percent on its Treasury 
Bills in the last five years3. The high single-digit to double-digit returns could encourage banks 
to ‘invest’ in government treasury bills as opposed to actual intermediation of funds to the 
private sector.   
2.2.3 Empirical Studies 
There is a plethora of empirical literature on the effect of government borrowing on interest 
rates but a large body comes from developed countries whereas studies on developing countries 
are thin. In developed countries, empirical studies exhibit diverse results. Dewald (1983) 
examined the impact of deficits on both short-and long-term interest rates, with Vector Auto-
regression approach (VAR) using annual data and data averaged over the business cycle. The 
author found that, in both cases, deficits has a statistically significant effect on long-term rates 
but not short-term rates and conclude that deficits did not have a consistent effect on interest 
rates. However, one can interpret the same result differently since deficits affect long-term 
interest rates. A similar view was echoed by Hoelscher (1983) who used a loanable funds model 
to investigate the impact of fiscal deficits on short-term interest rates (one year T-bond rates) 
with expected inflation and output, and found no impact whatsoever, and conclude that short 
term interest rates are determined by inflation, monetary and general economic activities. 
However, with the inclusion of long-term interest rates (ten year T-bond rates) in an updated 
(1986) paper, over the period 1953-1984, Hoelscher found that fiscal deficits has a positive 
significant impact on long-term interest rates but found no evidence regarding short-term 
interest rates.  
Barro’s (1987) study on fiscal deficits shows an impact on long-term rates in the UK from the 
1700s through to 1918. However, the author did not overcome the endogeneity problems. In 
the "pure exogenous" case, the author found that fiscal deficits did not affect interest rate. To 
address the problem of endogeneity, Cebula (1988) examined the relationship between fiscal 
deficits and a variety of real long-term rates (i.e. 10 year T-bond & high grade municipal bonds) 
and also allowed for international capital flows and inflationary expectations, with 2SLS 
estimation. The author found that deficit has a significant positive effect on long-term rates.  
                                                          
3 http://www.mofep.gov.gh/financial-news 
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A novel approach called an ‘announcement effect’ used by Wachtel and Young (1987) shows 
that an increase in the projected deficits leads to an increase in interest rates, but long-term rates 
react more than short term interest rates. This was followed by a comprehensive study by Dua 
and Arora (1989) which used the IS-LM framework and the loanable funds flow model; the 
authors conclude that expectations of fiscal deficits have no effect on interest rates, rather the 
expected interest rates are dependent on money growth, expected unemployment, and inflation 
uncertainty. Quigley and Porter-Hudak (1994) used a different approach called an ‘intervention 
analysis’ of Box and Tiao (1975) and found less support for Wachtel and Young’s (1987) 
results. Intervention analysis is used to assess the impact of a special event on the time series 
of interest. The main focus is to estimate the dynamic eﬀect on the mean level of the series. 
Quigley and Porter-Hudak’s results shows that interest rates respond only 40 percent of the time 
to deficit announcements and when they do respond the impact is only temporary, but this 
depends on the size of the announced change in deficits.  
Makin (1983) used a univariate regression equation to estimate the changes in the three-month 
Treasury bill rate as a function of the change in the actual deficit, and found that the coefficient 
for the deficit variable is not statistically significant. Similar results for the deficit variable were 
also reported for long-term interest rates. However, this result is unlikely to be robust because 
Makin’s estimation did not include other important determinants such as money supply and 
inflation. Evans (1985) incorporates more determinants such as the nominal interest rate, real 
government spending, real deficit, real money stock and expected inflation for the period 1979 
to 1983. The author used two-stage least squares estimation to deal with the problem of 
endogeneity of the deficit, and still found an insignificant or negative relationship between 
interest rates and deficits. While the deficits lowering interest rates do not conform to economic 
theory, disruptions in the market mechanism such as price controls and rationing may have been 
the cause since much of Evan’s analysis pertain to the wartime period. By contrast, Cebula et 
al. (1990) used two quarterly models (instrumental variables technique and the Cochrane-Orcutt 
procedure) which directly parallel Evans’ IS-LM framework, and extend the time period from 
1971-1985. The authors found strong empirical evidence that the federal budget deficit raised 
the ex post real rate of interest.  
Darrat (1990) tested the direction of causality between interest and deficit using long-term 
Moody's AAa-bond interest rates and deficits, and found that deficits do not Granger-cause 
interest rates and interest rates do not Granger-cause deficits, and conclude that deficits and 
long rates do not have a long-term relationship. However, Raynold (1994) argues that poor 
relationships between deficits and interest rates occurred because previous studies ignored 
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liquidity constraints. The author ran a Vector Auto-regression approach (VAR) using the same 
variables on short-term and long-term corporate rates but added two variables (real value of 
liabilities of failed firms and real value of deposits of failed banks) as proxies for liquidity 
constraints. The author found that when these variables are included into the model, deficits 
have significantly negative effects on interest rates.  
Deviating from time series analyses, Hutchison and Pyle (1984) regressed short-term rates on 
the "pooled" deficits of seven major industrialised countries with money growth, 
unemployment rate and country-specific data, and found that pooled government deficits 
caused the real short-term rates to rise. A similar study by Correia-Nunes and Stemitsiotis 
(1995) tested the impact of nominal interest rate on fiscal deficit on the cross-country data of 
ten OECD countries, and found that there was evidence of crowding out as the interest rate was 
positively linked to the deficit. The same result was echoed by Ford and Laxton (1995) who 
examined the data for nine OECD countries with simultaneous equation models and conclude 
that the increase in government debt since the early 1970s was a major factor in the rise in real 
interest rates in the 1980s and early 1990s.   
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990) regressed world average expected short-term interest rates on 
world stock returns, oil prices, world monetary growth and world deficits for ten OECD 
countries during 1959-88. The authors found deficits and debts are insignificant while all the 
other variables are significant and conclude that each country's expected real interest rate 
depends primarily on world factors, rather than own-country factors, thereby suggesting a good 
deal of integration of world capital and goods markets. 
Baldacci and Kumar (2010) examined the impact of fiscal deficit and public debt on interest 
rates for a panel of 31 advanced and emerging market economies over the period from 1980 to 
2008 with fixed effect and system GMM estimation. Results suggest that higher deficits and 
public debt lead to a significant increase in long-term interest rates but this is greater in countries 
with weak initial fiscal conditions; weak or inadequate institutions; structural factors (such as 
low domestic savings); and limited access to global capital.  
Laubach (2011) used a Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) to measure the effects of 
fiscal policies on interest rates and other variables in the United States prior to the onset of the 
financial crisis. The author concludes that fiscal tightening, defined as either increasing the 
surplus or decreasing the deficit, reduces interest rates.  
Bayat et al. (2012) studied the causal relationship between budget deficit, and its ratio to gross 
domestic product, and interest rates in the Turkish economy during years between 2006 and 
2011, employing the linear Granger type causality test. Results show that there is no causal 
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relation between budget deficits, nominal interest rates, supporting the existence of the 
Ricardian equivalence hypothesis. Odionye and Ebi (2013) empirically examined the 
relationship between the budget deficit and interest rates in Nigeria using a Vector Error 
Correction (VEC) model for the period from Q1 1970 to Q4 2010. They authors conclude that 
budget deficit has a positive and significant impact on interest rate. 
A comprehensive study by Aisen and Hauner (2013) estimated the impact of budget deficit on 
interest for advanced and emerging economies using system Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) ) over a panel dataset of 60 advanced and emerging economies and found a highly 
significant positive effect of budget deficits on interest rates, but the effect depends on 
interaction terms and is only significant under one of the several conditions: deficits are high, 
mostly domestically financed, or interact with high domestic debt; financial openness is low; 
interest rates are liberalized; or financial depth is low.  
Cebula (2015) provides empirical evidence on the impact of net U.S. government borrowing 
(budget deficits) on the nominal interest rate yield on ten-year Treasury notes using annual data 
for the period 1972-2012. The GLM (Generalized Linear Model) estimates imply that the 
federal budget deficit exercise a positive and statistically significant impact on the nominal 
interest rate yield on ten-year Treasury notes. 
Kelikume (2016) applied panel Vector Auto regression techniques (PVAR) across 18 countries 
of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) over the period 2000 to 2014 and concludes that interest rate 
response to government fiscal deficit is insensitive.  
Capener et al. (2017) used auto-regressive, i.e., AR (1), two-stage least squares to investigate 
the impact of the federal budget deficit GDP) in the U.S. on the ex-ante real interest rate yield 
on Moody's Baa-rated corporate bonds from 1960 through 2015. The authors found that if the 
federal budget deficit were to rise by one percentage point, say from 3% to 4% of GDP, the ex-
ante real interest rate would rise by 58 basis points. 
Despite the large attention given to developed economies, the economies with the highest 
interest rates in the world and a history of fiscal mismanagement are in the developing countries. 
In the context of developing countries which is closest to the focus of our study, empirical 
studies on the link between budget deficit and the interest rate are limited. A pioneering study 
by Ahmad (1994) investigates the relationship between interest rates and government deficits 
in Pakistan over the period 1970-1991 with IS-LM model and found that government budget 
deficits did not exert significant influence on nominal or real interest rates. A similar study by 
Mukhtar and Zakaria (2008) examined the relationship between government debt and long-term 
interest rates with the Cointegration analysis and Granger causality test from 1960-2005 and 
30 
 
conclude that budget deficits do not have a significant effect on nominal interest rates. Pandit 
(2005) examined the relationship between long-term nominal interest rates and budget deficit 
variables in Nepal with Cointegration and Error-Correction Mechanism (ECM) techniques for 
the period 1975-2003. In the model, the nominal interest rate is a function of the inflation rate, 
income, fiscal policy variables, and the central bank holding of government securities. The 
author found evidence that there exists a positive but insignificant positive relationship between 
the long-term nominal interest rate of government securities and budget deficit variables. The 
author concludes that both supply of and demand for long term government securities are not 
market based.  
Akinboade (2010) investigates the budget deficit–interest rate relationships in South Africa 
with two econometric methods: the London School and the Granger‐causality methods. The 
author’s results suggest that budget deficits have no effect on interest rates in South Africa.  
A different result was found by Anyanwu (1998) who applied regression analysis to pooled 
cross-section and time-series data for Nigeria, Ghana and the Gambia. The author’s results 
indicate that fiscal deficits and government debts have a positive impact on interest rates. Obi 
and Nurudeen (2008) conduct an empirical test on the effects of fiscal deficits and government 
debts on interest rates in Nigeria using a Vector Auto Regressive (VAR) approach. Their 
findings confirmed a positive interest rate effect of debt and fiscal deficits. This implies that 
interest rates react to changes in credit markets in Nigeria, Ghana and Gambia. However, the 
two studies ignored other important determinants such as money supply and inflation. For 
instance, Nigeria has had double-digit inflation on average in the last decade, so expected 
inflation could have a huge impact which was not captured in. Secondly, Nigerian banks are 
awash with excess liquidity but money supply was not included.  
A study by Chakraborty (2012) examined whether there was any evidence of financial crowding 
out in the recent years of the financially deregulated interest rate regime in India with Vector 
Auto Regressive (VAR) model between 206-2011. The author found no significant relationship 
between the two. In fact, the results reveals that neither the long-term nor short-term interest 
rate was determined by fiscal deficits in India. 
However, credit markets rarely reach equilibrium through changes in interest rates alone 
(Temin and Voth, 2005). Changes in the quantity of credit could give a better insight into the 
effect of government borrowing. With regard to the quantity of private credit, Temin and Voth 
(2005) argued that examinations of interest rates are fundamentally misguided, and that the 
18th- and early 19th-century private loan market balanced through quantity rationing in 
England. The authors used a VAR approach with a unique set of observations on lending 
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volume at Hoare’s Bank and conclude that there was substantial crowding out: a 1% rise in 
government debt led to a 1% decline in private lending.  
Christensen (2005) regressed private sector lending on domestic debt in 27 sub-Sahara African 
countries over the period 1980–2000. The author’s results showed significant support for the 
crowding-out hypothesis: on average across countries, an expansion in domestic debt of one 
percent relative to broad money causes the ratio of private sector lending to broad money to 
decline by 0.15 percent. Christensen’s study used a pooled OLS which is likely to have potential 
biases induced by simultaneity, omitted variables, and unobserved country-specific effects. 
Second, there have been some changes since 2000 as many developing countries have moved 
towards market liberalisation.  
Abdel-Kader (2006) conducted a survey of some state owned and private banks and 351 firms 
from various sectors in Egypt. The study investigates the extent of credit decline to the private 
sector in Egypt and whether it was due to supply factors (credit crunch), demand factors (credit 
slowdown), or other factors (e.g., crowding out). The study found that interest rates were no 
longer the decisive factor in lending decisions. More so, due to the problem of non-performing 
loans, banks were becoming more risk-averse, as reflected by the reduction in private credit and 
investment in more liquid and less risky assets, such as treasury bills and government bonds.  
A comprehensive study by Emran and Farazi (2009) explored the crowding-out of private 
investment in developing countries. The study measured the effect of government borrowing 
on private credit with system-GMM from 1975-2006 on 60 developing countries. The estimates 
indicated that $1.00 more of government borrowing reduces private credit by $1.40, which is 
generally consistent with a ‘lazy bank’ model of bank behaviour in developing countries. This 
study improved on previous studies by using system-GMM to control for endogeneity; 
however, its major drawback was lumping all developing countries together; there are 30 
resource-rich countries in the 60 developing countries. Furthermore, Emran and Farazi (2009) 
assumed the relationship between government borrowing and interest rate in developing 
countries is ‘very weak at best’ without substantiating it.  
Riccardo de Bonis (2010) investigates the role of total government debt on the size of bank 
loans to the private sector with system-GMM in 20 emerging economies. The results shows that 
there are mainly two channels which the credit size is affected by government debt. First, 
government debt reduces the size of private sector credit. Second, the low private credit 
corresponds to a large size of government activities. 
Fayed (2012) used a co-integration approach to investigate the relationship between 
government borrowing and private credit and found evidence that government borrowing from 
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domestic banks does crowd-out private credit which reflects the domestic banks' preference to 
invest in a low-risk high-return investment.  
Shetta and Kamaly (2014) used a VAR model on quarterly data spanning 1970-2009 to gauge 
the crowding out effect of government domestic borrowing on private credit in Egypt. The 
authors’ estimates indicate that a $1.00 more of government borrowing reduces private credit 
by $1.80. Ahmed (2016) estimated bank supply side equation in Pakistan using 3SLS from 
1990-2013. The author found that Government borrowing leads to crowding credit away from 
possible productive use by the private sector, as the coefficient on the Treasury bill rate turns 
out to be negative and significant. Choudhary et al. (2016) analyzed the pressure fiscal 
expansion exerts on the economy via credit markets in Pakistan from 1975-2008. Their dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium modeling (DSGE) captures the counter cyclical behavior of 
government borrowings that leads to counter cyclical spreads in loans market. The authors 
conclude that government borrowing leads to crowding out of private credit and rise in interest 
rate spreads.  
This research study quantifies the effect of government domestic borrowing on lending interest 
rate and private credit in oil-dependent countries. Economies dominated by hydrocarbons 
possess certain characteristics not shared by other economies because their economic dynamics 
are mainly determined by the prices of oil and gas at world markets rather than by domestic 
economic activity, thus the volatility and uncertainty of resources revenues pose challenges for 
the design of appropriate policy framework 
 
Table 2.3: Literature Review for Developing Countries 
No Topic Country/Region Model/Variables Main Findings 
1 Fiscal spending and 
crowding out. A 
comparison between 
developed and developing 
countries (Mahmoudzadeh 
et al, 2013) 
Developed and 
developing countries 
(2000-2009) 
Engle-Granger 
cointegration 
(private investment; 
government investment  
government 
consumption, inflation 
government deficit, 
etc.) 
Financing budget 
deficits crowd out 
private investment in 
developed countries 
whereas it crowds in 
private investment in 
developing countries. 
2 Interactions Between Public 
and Private Investment: 
Evidence from Developing 
Countries (Atukeren, 2005) 
Developing Countries 
( 1970–2000) 
Cointegration, Granger 
causality and Probit 
regression (private 
investment, public  
investment and GDP) 
 
 
 
 
There is no bottom-line 
on the impact of public 
investments on private 
investments i.e. 
crowding out/crowding 
in. The results differ 
from country to 
country. 
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3 Lazy Banks? Government 
Borrowing and Private 
Credit in Developing 
Countries (Emran and 
Farazi, 2009) 
Developing Countries 
(panel data on 60 
developing countries 
period 1975 to 2006) 
GMM (Private credit, 
government borrowing, 
GDP, growth 
rate of per capita GDP, 
inflation rate,  
institutional quality, and 
lending rate) 
The estimates prove the 
strong negative effect 
of government 
borrowing from the 
domestic banking 
sector on the volume of 
private credit. 
4 Does Public Borrowing 
Crowd out Private 
Investment? The 
Bangladesh Evidence 
(Majumder, 2007) 
Bangladesh (1976-2006) 
 
SVECM (GDP, public 
and private sector gross 
fixed capital formation, 
etc.) 
Public capital 
accumulation crowds out 
private investment in 
India over1950-2012, the 
opposite is true when we 
restrict the sample post  
1980. This change can 
most likely be attributed 
to the policy reforms 
which started during early 
1980s  
5 Has Government 
investment crowded out 
Private Investment in India? 
(Mitra, 2005) 
India (1969-2005) SVAR (government 
investment, private 
investment, and gross 
domestic product)  
The findings do not 
establish a substantive 
link between 
government and private 
investment or more 
specifically deficits and 
interest rates. 
 
6 Crowding-Out or 
Crowding- In? Analysing 
the Effects of Government 
Spending on Private 
Investment in Turkey (Sen 
and  Kaya, 2013) 
 
Turkey (1975-2011) Modified version 
Aschauer’s (1989) 
model, Johansen 
Cointegration (private 
investment, government 
current spending, 
government current 
transfer spending, 
government capital 
spending, government 
interest spending, GDP) 
There is crowding out 
of private investment in 
response to government 
current transfer 
spending, government 
current spending, and 
government interest 
spending whereas 
government capital 
spending crowds-in 
private investment. 
 
7 Crowding Out Effect of 
Public Borrowing: The Case 
of Egypt (Fayed, 2012) 
 
Egypt (1998-2010) VECM (private credit 
as a percentage of 
industrial production, 
government borrowing 
also as a percentage of 
industrial production, 
log of industrial 
production, level of 
financial 
intermediation, 
institutional quality, the 
lending rate) 
Greater than 
proportional crowding 
out of private sector 
credit due to 
government borrowing.  
Increase in banks' 
holdings of government 
securities also show 
banks’ behaviour of 
investing in a low risk 
high return. 
 
8 Does government 
investment crowd out 
private investment in 
China?  (Xu and Yan, 2014 
 
China (1980 to 2011) SVAR model VAR 
framework (private 
fixed asset investment, 
government fixed asset 
investment in the public 
goods and state 
infrastructure, 
government fixed asset 
investment in private 
goods, mainly through 
SOEs) 
 
The results propose that 
government 
investment in public 
goods “crowds in” 
private investment 
significantly, 
while government 
investment in the 
private goods, “crowds 
out” private investment 
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9 Government Budget 
Deficits and interest Rates: 
An Empirical Analysis for 
Pakistan ( Burney et al., 
1989) 
Pakistan (1970-1989) OLS (overall 
government 
budget deficit, deficit 
financed through 
domestic borrowing, 
deficit financed through 
borrowing from the 
domestic banking 
system, call money rate, 
inflation) 
There is no relationship 
exists between the 
overall government 
budget deficit and the 
nominal interest rates. 
However, they linked 
the deficit with higher 
nominal interest if 
financed through 
borrowing from the 
banking system and 
suggest that it may end 
up in crowding-out 
private investment. 
 
10 Effectiveness of 
Government Expenditure 
Crowding-In or Crowding-
Out: Empirical Evidence in 
Case of Pakistan (Hussain 
et at., 2009) 
Pakistan (1975-2008) OLS, ECM, Co- 
Integration (defense 
expenditure, health and 
education expenditure, 
Social Welfare 
expenditure, 
transportation, 
infrastructure and 
communication 
expenditure, debts 
servicing expenditure, 
GDP, gross fixed) 
Research concludes 
that expenditure on 
defense and debt 
serving crowds-out 
private investment 
whereas spending on 
infrastructure, health 
and education  
crowds-in private 
investment. 
11 The Dominant Borrower 
Syndrome: The Case of 
Pakistan (Choudhary et al., 
2016) 
Pakistan (1975-2008) Vector Auto regression 
(VAR) model (real 
output, credit spread, 
government borrowing, 
borrowing by private 
sector, inflation) 
Dominant Borrower 
Syndrome (DBS) leads 
to crowding out of 
private sector 
investment and rise in 
interest rate spreads 
 
12 Domestic Debt Markets in 
sub-Saharan Africa 
(Christensen, 2005) 
Sub-Saharan Africa  
countries (1980-2000) 
Pooled OLS (private 
sector credit and 
domestic debt, etc.) 
 
An expansion in 
domestic debt of one 
percent relative to 
broad money causes the 
ratio of private sector 
lending to broad money 
to decline by 0.15 
percent. 
13 Does The Budget Deficit 
Crowd- Out Private Credit 
From Banking Sector? The 
Case of Egypt (Shetta and 
Kamaly, 2014) 
Egypt (Q1-1970 to 
Q2-2009) 
VAR (private credit , 
government borrowing, 
GDP, etc.) 
A greater than 
proportional crowding 
out of private credit 
was observed owing to 
government borrowing 
from domestic banks. 
14 The Crowding Out Effect of 
Budget Deficits on Private 
Investment in Nigeria 
(Asogwa and Okeke, 2013) 
Nigeria (1981-2010) 
 
OLS and Granger 
Causality (private 
investment , budget 
deficit, external debt 
stock, inflation, etc.)  
  
 
Crowding out of 
private investment is 
confirmed while 
analysing the 
budget deficits. 
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2.1                                                                                                        Chapter 3 
                                                          Data and Methodology 
 
3.1 Data description 
This study estimates (i) the link between finance and the non-oil sector growth and (ii) 
government domestic borrowing and changes in private sector credit and lending rates for a 
panel of 28 oil-dependent countries. The study used annual data (unless stated otherwise) for 
all the variables spanning 1990 to 2012. The data are obtained from World Bank World 
Development Indicator (WDI). The sample of country is listed in Table 3.1 
 Table 3.1 Oil-rich countries: descriptive statistics (2006-2012) 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Author’s calculations 
Country Resource  exports   Resource  revenues    Oil as a  
 % of total exports % of total fiscal revenues                  % of GDP 
    
    
Algeria 94 74 22 
Angola 96 77 24 
Azerbaijan 95 65 28 
Bolivia 5 33 6 
Bahrain 80 81 6 
Cameroun 47 27 7 
Chad  85 68 22 
Congo Rep 80 70 19 
Dem. Rep. Congo                   88                                                        30                           12 
Ecuador 55 35 14 
Equatorial Guinea                  93 92 31 
Gabon 80 60 30 
Indonesia 10 25 3 
Iran 79 63 25 
Kuwait 93 95 45 
Kazakhstan 60 40 16 
Malaysia 11 25 4 
Mexico 15 36 3 
Nigeria 96 70 21 
Oman 73 83 26 
PNG 80 32 10 
Qatar 88 58 19 
Saudi Arabia 87 79 45 
Syria 40 25 19 
Trinidad 38 49 7 
Venezuela 93 58        17 
Yemen 82 68 28 
Vietnam 14 25 4 
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A country is oil-dependent if the share of hydrocarbons contributes at least 25 percent of total 
fiscal revenues and/or total exports (IMF, 2012). Norway is excluded because it is a highly 
developed country. Russia is excluded because it is borderline on most developed-country 
metrics. Due to missing data issues, Iraq and Libya are also excluded. From Table 3.1, natural 
resource dependence is as high as 90% in Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Dem. Rep. Congo, 
Equatorial Guinea and Venezuela, and as low as 25% in Malaysia, Indonesia, Mexico, Bolivia 
and Vietnam. Oil as a percentage of GDP in each country varies and has been changing over 
the years; it is a lot higher in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Angola, Oman, Azerbaijan, Iran, Equatorial 
Guinea, Yemen, Gabon and Algeria than in most oil-rich countries. Nigeria used to be as high 
as 30% but with the rebasing which increased Nigeria’s GDP to 89 per cent in 2014, oil 
contribution has shrunk to a mere 9%. Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico and Vietnam have been at 
the forefront of diversifying their economies, not surprisingly, they have the lowest oil 
contribution to GDP.  Figure 3.1 shows the trajectory of world oil price; oil price rose steadily 
between 1995 and 2008, thereafter, it nosedived to $60 per barrel due to the global financial 
crises, it increased for a while and plunged again in 2013. For the study period 1990-2012, 
world oil price rose steadily with intermittent volatility.  
Figure 3.1: World Oil Price 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.2 shows government domestic borrowing exhibits the most fluctuation. Countries with 
higher resource revenue as a percent of total fiscal revenue tend to borrow less from domestic 
banks. It also noteworthy that borrowing from domestic banks fluctuates in line with resource 
rents; countries with higher resource revenue as a percent of total fiscal revenue borrow less 
from banks when prices of hydrocarbons are high and more from banks when prices are low. 
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For instance, countries like Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Angola, Oman and Congo Republic etc. 
borrowed less over the given period whereas countries like Yemen, Vietnam, Malaysia, Mexico 
and Indonesia borrowed more. The Institutional  Quality Index (as shown in Table 3.2)  assigns 
a score (0-100) to each country’s performance and higher scores correspond to higher levels of 
institutional quality with components such as  fiscal burden, government intervention, monetary 
policy, banking and finance, property rights, etc. Countries with ‘good’ quality of institutions 
have  index of over 80 (i.e. Australia, 81; New Zealand, 83) but the worst index in oil-rich 
countries are Dem. Rep Congo, 35; Venezuela, 42; Congo Republic, 43; and Angola, 45; while 
a few countries score relatively high: Trinidad, 70; Qatar, 71; and Bahrain, 75. 
 
Table 3.2 Oil-rich countries: further descriptive statistics (2006-2012) 
  
*Government debt, bank credit, and government consumption are measured as percentage of GDP 
 Source:  Author’s calculations 
Country Government    Bank  Institutional  Government  Lending   
  Debt Credit Quality  Consumption  Rate 
Algeria -35 22 56 20 8 
Angola -3.8 15 45 19 25 
Azerbaijan -1.5 17 58 13 9 
Bolivia 10 49 60 17 12 
Bahrain -2 57 75 16 8 
Cameroun -3.5 10 53 12 18 
Chad  -0.3 5 46 5 19 
Congo Rep -18 1 43 18 25 
Dem. Rep Congo 0.5 3 35 15 15 
Ecuador -3 22 52 14 12 
Equatorial Guinea -6 2 51 21 15 
Gabon -2 10 55 15 18 
Indonesia 8 40 56 10 13 
Iran -2.5 33 42 11 12 
Kuwait -3 60 62 25 7 
Kazakhstan 1.2 45 58 11 11 
Malaysia 4 119 65 13 6 
Mexico 15 43 62 12 8 
Nigeria -3 19 54 12 18 
Oman -12 32 66 27 6 
PNG 3 29 52 14 11 
Qatar 10 71 71 20 6 
Saudi Arabia -40 10 64 30 7 
Syria 3 15 47 10 13 
Trinidad -12 32 70 16 10 
Venezuela 3 23 42 15 17 
Yemen 8 7 50 13 22 
Vietnam 7 84 51 6 13 
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The volatility of resource rent and its relation with government fiscal stance is what makes oil- 
rich countries different from other countries. From Table 3.2, countries with higher resource 
revenue or higher resource exports tend to have lower bank credit on average, which highlights 
the depressing effect of resource revenues on financial intermediation. For instance, bank 
credits in Angola, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Congo Rep, Dem. Rep Congo, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon, Venezuela, and Yemen are relatively lower than in other oil-rich countries. Conversely, 
countries with lower resource revenue or resource exports have higher bank credit; for instance, 
Mexico, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and Bolivia. However, even though Bahrain, Qatar, and 
Kuwait have high resource revenue, they also have relatively higher bank credit; not 
surprisingly, financial services have increased tremendously in these countries and the growth 
of the non-oil sector has been growing steadily which shows that increased bank credit is 
positively associated with economic diversification.  
On average, fiscal size (measured by the government consumption share in GDP) is particularly 
high in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Algeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Kuwait and Oman which are 
heavily resource-dependent economies and this is an indicator of the dominant role of 
government, whereas government size is relatively low in Vietnam, Mexico, Chad and 
Indonesia. Bank lending rate seems to be lower in Bahrain, Kuwait, Mexico, Malaysia, Oman, 
Qatar and Saudi Arabia and these countries have better Institutional Quality Index which shows 
there is some relationship between quality of institutions and financial intermediation. 
Conversely, countries with higher lending rates like Yemen, Congo Republic, Chad, Angola 
and Nigeria have lower Institutional Quality Index which reaffirms that the quality of 
institutions has a potential impact on financial intermediation. 
The dataset encompasses the 1990-2012 period. The sample data includes all the countries for 
which data were available. However, some variables are limited to a much smaller group. The 
time span is 23 years and the panel is unbalanced. We have some reasons for choosing this 
period; financial sector development has only started to gather pace in the 1990s (Ranjan and 
Zingales, 2003). More so, this study period started from 1990 to reduce the problem of missing 
variables, and the timeframe ended at 2012 because data were not readily available when this 
research study started. There are also some missing variables worth mentioning; Kazakhstan, 
Iran and Dem. Rep of Congo have five years each of missing lending rates, though randomly. 
Oman and Venezuela have four years each of missing Inflation. The dataset for Syria ends at 
the year 2009 for all variables, rather than 2012. The last two research questions require all the 
variables to be used annually with OLS and Fixed-effect, but the Difference and System 
Generalised Method of Moments take non-overlapping four-year averages to remedy missing 
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data, mitigate high degrees of persistence, smooth short-term fluctuations and to reduce the 
potential bias arising from having a large number of time observations in a dynamic panel 
estimation. The first two research questions are estimated with Westerlund Panel Cointegration, 
Mean Group, Dynamic Fixed effect, and Pooled Mean Group; they do not incorporate the 
missing variables, five variables are used for the estimations, the variables with missing data 
are excluded.  
3.1.2 Dependent variables  
Domestic Lending Rate → This measures the bank lending rate that usually meets the short- 
and medium-term financing needs of the private sector. Given that most interest rates are highly 
correlated, the banks’ lending rate is used as a proxy for the nominal interest rates (e.g. Bhalla, 
1995; Deepak et al., 2002). 
Bank Credit → This is the credit provided by the banking system to the private sector as a 
percentage of GDP. This measure indicates the extent to which funds are channelled into the 
private sector by financial intermediaries. This measure is better than other measures of 
financial development because it is more directly linked to investment and growth (Calderón 
and Liu, 2003, p. 326; Fitzgerald, 2006).  
Non-hydrocarbon GDP Per Capita Growth → This study follows the convention in the 
literature by using real per capita GDP as an indicator of growth. Hence, we measure economic 
development in terms of real GDP per capita growth. Thereafter, we differentiate the 
hydrocarbon sector and the non-hydrocarbon sector.  
3.1.3 Independent variables of interest 
Domestic Debt → This measures the claims on the central government by the domestic deposit 
money banks and other financial institutions. The sign for this variable is expected to be 
negative because increased government borrowing could crowd out private credit as espoused 
(e.g. Christensen, 2005; Emran and Farazi, 2009; Shetta and Kamaly, 2013).  
Bank Credit → The proxy for financial intermediation is the credit provided by financial 
intermediaries to the private sector. This measure indicates the extent to which funds are 
channelled into the private sector by the domestic banks. One of the most critical factors when 
investigating the relationship between financial development and economic growth is how to 
attain a reasonable measure of financial development. Most of the proxies used in previous 
studies are ambiguous and may give misleading results (Zingales, 2003). Bank credit is better 
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than other measures of financial development used in the literature (i.e. M2 and M3 as a ratio 
of nominal GDP) because it is more directly linked to investment and growth, that is, credit 
granted to the private sector by the banks. The nominal value of the flow of credit to the private 
sector is deflated by the GDP deflator to obtain real credit flow. Bank credit captures financial 
intermediation and thus the quantitative development of the banking sector. The ratio of liquid 
liabilities to GDP is another popular proxy used in quantifying financial development. 
However, some studies such as Demetriades and Hussein (1996), Favara (2003), Khan and 
Senhadji (2003), and Ang and McKibbin (2007) argue that M2 and M3 are poor proxies, 
especially in countries with underdeveloped financial systems because a high level of 
monetization might be linked to financial underdevelopment and vice versa. More so, the ratio 
of liquid liabilities to GDP mostly captures the ability of the financial system to provide 
transaction services rather than the ability to channel money from savers to borrowers in the 
economy (Khan and Senhadji, 2003). Several studies (e.g. Atje and Boyan, 1993; Beck and 
Levine, 2003; Ang and McKibbin, 2007) used stock market indices such as stock market 
capitalization to GDP and the ratio of traded value to GDP to quantify financial development; 
but they are not directly linked to investment and growth. Moreover, we use bank-based 
financial proxy due to the dearth of long-span time series data for the stock market indices in 
most of our sample countries. 
3.1.4 Other explanatory variables 
GDP Per Capita → This study follows the convention in the literature by using real per capita 
GDP as an indicator of growth. We control for income level, as richer countries tend to have a 
more developed financial sector. Also, per capita income growth is important as rapidly 
growing economies are likely to have greater demand for and supply of credit (e.g. Djankov et. 
al., 2007; Emran and Farazi, 2009).  
Money Supply → This measures the sum of currency outside banks, demand deposits other 
than those of the central government, and the time, savings, and foreign currency deposits of 
resident sectors other than the central government. We control for this variable because an 
increased money supply might lead to liquidity surges – thus to credit expansion. 
Trade Openness → The Openness Index is calculated as the ratio of the country's total trade, 
the sum of exports plus imports, to the country's gross domestic product. To capture openness, 
the indicator trade openness is used. The sign for this variable is expected to be positive since 
a relatively open economy could dampen the effect of government borrowing. This will 
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possibly facilitate economic growth by increasing domestic firms’ markets and by allowing 
them to acquire inputs at competitive prices (Shan et al., 2006).  
Institutional Quality → Institutions are the sets of rules and norms that shape social, political, 
and economic interactions among the members of a society. Better institutions are associated 
with more transparency and accountability, less corruption, and better protection of property 
rights. As a proxy for the quality of institutions, we use the Heritage Foundation’s Index of 
Economic Freedom. This index aggregates 10 components with equal weight namely: trade 
policy, fiscal burden, government intervention, monetary policy, capital flows and foreign 
investment, banking and finance, property rights, wages and prices, regulation, and black 
market. The index assigns a score (0-100) to each country’s performance and higher scores 
correspond to higher levels of institutional quality. The sign for this variable is expected to be 
positive because better institutions are an important determinant of private credit (e.g. La Porta 
et al., 1997). The sign is expected to be positive because better institutions such as political and 
legal structures boost economic growth (e.g. Barro, 1997). 
Inflation → This is the growth rate of the annual consumer price index (CPI). It is commonly 
included as a measure of macroeconomic stability. The sign for this variable is expected to be 
negative. We control for this variable because high inflation could undermine the supply of 
loanable funds (e.g. Miguel et al., 2014). The literature on the relationship between inflation 
and economic growth has shown that there might be no relationship (Sidrauski, 1967), a 
negative relationship (Fisher, 1993) or a positive relationship (Mallik and Chowdhury, 2001) 
between these two variables. However, this nexus has gone beyond a simple relationship to 
what level of inflation can affect economic growth. The coefficient of this variable is expected 
to be negative (e.g. Barro, 1997). 
Price of Crude Oil → Oil prices, generally recorded in barrel per USD, usually refer to crude 
oil prices of the front month futures contract of the benchmark crude oil grades WTI (WTI; 
traded at the NYMEX, New York) or Brent (traded at the IPE, London). We use annual average 
Brent Crude oil spot price as a major benchmark price for purchases of oil worldwide. Using 
the oil price index as an independent variable allows us to measure the impact of world oil price 
fluctuation on the oil and non-oil sectors. We deflate this variable by the consumer price index 
(CPI) to obtain the real crude oil price in each country. The sign of the coefficient for this 
variable is expected to be positive since an increase in the price of crude oil will increase 
government revenues and spending. The sign for this variable is expected to be positive because 
an increase in the price of crude oil will result in a windfall and presumably increase bank 
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credit. We control for this variable because high crude oil prices could dampen the effect of 
government borrowing on bank credit.  
Government Size →This is measured by the share of government consumption as a percentage 
of GDP. It excludes expenditure on capital, transfers and debt servicing. Countries with 
relatively higher government expenditure are more likely to experience lower economic growth 
because higher government spending requires more tax revenue which leads to misallocation 
i.e. by transferring additional resources from the productive sector of the economy to the 
government, which uses them less efficiently. This indicator is particularly important in natural 
resource-rich economies because of the high level of fiscal leakage coupled with transparency 
and accountability issues (Ades and Di Tella, 1999). 
3.2  Econometric Analysis (A) 
In this section, we review the general framework for panel data analysis. We discuss common 
econometric issues in panel data: panel unit root test, panel cointegration, static models, and 
dynamic models. Following this, we rationalize the use of a panel ARDL model based on the 
three estimators: the mean group (MG), pooled mean group (PMG), and dynamic fixed effect 
(DFE) estimators developed by Pesaran et al. (1999). This section also discusses the rationale, 
efficiency and consistency of the preferred method. 
3.2.1 Model Specification 
The basic empirical model we postulate for modelling financial intermediation and economic 
development, which are denoted by  𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 and 𝑌𝑖𝑡 respectively, is the following log-linear 
function.   
 ln (Yit)  = ui +   βiln (FDit ) +  eit                                                                                                    (3.1) 
 
where the index  i = 1,...,N denotes countries , t =1, 2,...., T  denotes time.  
Estimating a model in the form of equation (3.1) could pose some endogeneity issues. This is 
due to the simultaneity bias arising from a simultaneous determination of the independent and 
the dependent variables (Kumar and Woo, 2010). For instance, fast-growing economies may 
have more capital available for lending, or countries with higher growth rates may have more 
demand for credit, which may result in the misleading inference that additional bank lending 
causes growth or increased growth causes additional bank lending.  
Another reason is related to potential omitted-variable bias that results when an excluded 
variable is correlated with both the dependent variable and one or more of the independent 
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variables. For example, countries that have well-developed banking sectors tend to have better 
institutions to support the rule of law and protect property rights and researchers may 
mistakenly attribute higher growth to banking capacity or vice versa rather than to better 
institutions (Cevik and Rahmati, 2013). 
3.2.2 Estimation Approach 
The estimation approach is presented under sub-themes: panel unit test, panel cointegration test, 
mean group, dynamic fixed effect and pooled mean group estimators.   
3.2.3 Panel unit root test 
The first step is to test for stationarity in the variables to ensure that no series exceeds I (1) order 
of integration. This study employs a Fisher-type test based on augmented Dickey-Fuller (Fisher 
ADF Chi-square) and Phillips-Perron (Fisher-PP Chi-square) unit root tests. The advantage of 
the Fisher-type test is that it does not require a balanced panel. It has the advantage of using 
completely heterogeneous specifications and the possibility of using different lag lengths in the 
individual ADF or PP regressions. In addition, Maddada and Wu (1999) compared Fisher-type, 
Im, Pesaran and Shin Levin (2003), and Lin and Chu (2002) panel unit root tests in the case of 
cross-sectional dependence among the variables and presented Monte-Carlo simulations in 
favour of Fisher-type tests. Maddada and Wu (1999) pointed out that when a mixture of 
stationary and nonstationary series in the group is included in the alternative hypothesis, the 
Fisher-type is the best among others because the test is more powerful in distinguishing the null 
and alternative hypotheses. 
Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001) suggest using non-parametric and Fisher-type tests 
based on the idea of combining the p-values of the test-statistics from the arbitrary unit root test 
(the ADF test or other nonstationary test) in each cross sectional unit. Maddala and Wu (1999) 
argue that pooling on the basis of p-value has the advantage of allowing for as much 
heterogeneity across units as possible. If the statistics from different unit root tests are 
continuous, the significance levels (p-values)  𝑝1 (1, 2…..N) are independent uniform (0, 1) 
variables and -2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑒 𝑝1 has a 𝑋
2 distribution with two degrees of freedom.  
Using the additive property of the 𝑋2 variables, we obtain the Fisher test (1932): 
 
                                                             2 ∑ logNi=1 pi 
 
Which has a X2 distribution with 2N degrees of freedom.  
Choi (2001) considers the following model using the properties of the Fisher test:  
44 
 
                                                             Yit  =  dit  +   Xit                                                        (3.2)       
 
Where i = 1, 2… N represents the cross sectional units t =1, 2, ..., T  represents the time period. 
Moreover, the observed data comprises two components, namely a non-stochastic component 
(𝑑𝑖𝑡  ) and a stochastic component (𝑋𝑖𝑡):   dit = βio+ βi1t + ⋯ + βimi t
mi  
and  Xit = pix1 ( t−1)  +  uit 
Where 𝑢𝑖𝑡   is integrated of zero and may be heteroskedastic. The null hypothesis is given 
as:  𝐻𝑜 :  𝑝𝑖 – 1 for all i. Which implies the presence of a unit root. The alternative hypothesis 
is: 𝐻𝑎 : |𝑝𝑖| < 1 for at least one i for finite N or   𝐻𝑎 : |𝑝𝑖| < 1 for some i’s for infinite N. Next, 
let 𝐺𝑖𝑇𝑖  be a one sided unit test statistics (ADF and PP in our study) for i-th group in Eq. (3.2), 
based on the following assumptions:  
i) Under the null, as  𝑇𝑖  ,  𝐺𝑖𝑇𝑖   𝐺𝑖, (𝐺𝑖  being a non-degenerate random variable)  
ii) 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is independent of 𝑢𝑗𝑠 for all t and s when  i  j 
iii) 
𝑁𝑘
𝑁
  K as N   , (K being a fixed constant)  
Then then the asymptotic p-value for the  𝐺𝑖𝑇𝑖   under assumption 1 is defined as   𝑝𝑖 = F (𝐺𝑖𝑇𝑖 ) 
Where F (.) is the distribution function of 𝐺𝑖 .   
The proposed inverse chi-squared Fisher type panel unit root test statistics has the following 
form: P =  2 ∑ logNi=1 pi                                                                                                     (3.3)    
 
Equation (3.3) combines the p-values from the unit root tests for each cross sectional unit i to 
test for unit root in the panel. Under the null hypothesis of unit root, P is distributed as 
𝑋2 ( 2𝑁) 𝑎𝑠  𝑇𝑖    for all N. 
3.2.4 Panel cointegration test 
The second step tests whether financial and economic development are cointegrated.  The 
concept of cointegration was first developed by Granger (1981) and further explored by Engle 
and Granger (1987), Phillips and Ouliaris (1990), Johansen (1988), and Pedroni (2004). The 
basic idea is that if two or more time series variables are individually integrated of order n, then 
there is a possibility of at least one linear combination of them. Such a relationship between 
variables implies cointegration. Cointegrated variables exhibit strong steady-state relationships 
over long runs having common trends and co-movements. 
Similarly to the panel unit root, extension of time series cointegration tests to panel data is a 
recent phenomenon. Panel cointegration tests can be divided into two groups: the first group of 
tests has cointegration as the null hypothesis (McCoskey and Kao, 1998; Westerlund, 2005) 
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and the other group does not take cointegration as the null hypothesis (Pedroni 1999; Kao 1999; 
Larsson et al., 2001; Groen and Kleibergen, 2003).  
In this study, we use the four panel cointegration tests of Westerlund (2007), which have good 
small-sample properties and high power relative to the popular residual-based panel 
cointegration tests (e.g. Pedroni, 2004). Second, one advantage of using Westerlund (2007) 
panel cointegration tests is that the time series are allowed to be of unequal length.  The four 
panel cointegration test of Westerlund (2007) tests is designed to test the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration by testing whether the error correction term in a conditional error correction 
model is equal to zero. If the null hypothesis of no error correction is rejected, then the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration is also rejected.  
Westerlund (2007) considers the following error correction model where all variables in levels 
are assumed to be integrated of order 1; 
Yit = i
dt + αi( Yi t−1   -  βi
  xi t−1 )  +  ∑ αij
pi
j=1 Yi t−j  +  ∑ Yij 
pi
j=0 xit−j  + eit                 (3.4) 
Where 𝑑𝑡 = (1, t) holds the deterministic components,  𝑖
  = (1𝑖 , 2𝑖) are the associated vector 
of parameters. In order to allow for the estimation of the error correction parameter 𝛼𝑖 by least 
squares;                                                                                                               
Yit = i
dt + αiYit−1   -  i xit−1  +  ∑ αijpij=1 Yi t−j   +  ∑ Yij
pi
j=0 xit−j  + eit             (3.5) 
                                                                                                                          
Here the parameter 𝛼𝑖 provides an estimate of the speed of error correction towards the long 
run equilibrium. The parametrization of the equation (3.5) takes the parameter 𝛼𝑖 which remains 
unaffected by imposing an arbitrary 𝛽𝑖. Next, it is possible to construct a valid test of 𝐻𝑜 versus 
𝐻𝑎 that is asymptotically similar and whose distribution is free of nuisance parameters.  
Westerlund (2007) proposes four tests based on the least squares estimates of 𝛼𝑖 and its t-ratio 
for each individual i. The first two are called group mean and given as: 
Gt =  
 1
N
 ∑  mi=1     
α̂i
SE(α̂i)
              and         Gα =    
 1
N
 ∑  mi=1     
Tα̂i
α̂i(1)
 
Where SE (?̂?𝑖) is the standard error of  ?̂?𝑖.  𝐺𝑡 and  𝐺𝛼 test the null of  𝐻𝑜:  𝛼𝑖= 0 for all i versus 
the alternative of  𝐻𝑎: 𝛼𝑖< 0 for at least one i. In other words, the 𝐺𝑡 and  𝐺𝛼 test the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration for all cross-sectional units against the alternative that there is 
cointegration of at least one cross-sectional unit. The rejection of the null should therefore be 
taken as evidence of cointegration of at least one of the cross-sectional units. 
The other two tests are called panel statistics and given as follows: 
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                                  Pt = 
α̂
SE(α̂)
    and       Pα =  Tα̂ 
The  𝑃𝑡 and  𝑃𝛼  test  𝐻𝑜:  𝛼𝑖= 0 for all i versus the alternative of 𝐻𝑎: 𝛼𝑖< 0 for all i. In other 
words,  𝑃𝑡 and  𝑃𝛼 test statistics pool information over all the cross-sectional units to test the 
null of no cointegration for all cross-sectional units against the alternative of cointegration for 
all cross-sectional units. The rejection of the null should therefore be taken as evidence of 
cointegration for the panel as a whole. 
With a small dataset, such as the one in our study with T=23, Westerlund (2007) warns that the 
results of the tests may be sensitive to the specific choice of lag and lead lengths, which means 
if there is a cross sectional dependence over the units, the group mean and panel statistics are 
no longer valid. Hence, to avoid over-parameterization and the loss of predictive power, robust 
critical values can be obtained through bootstrapping.  
3.2.5 Dynamic Fixed Effect, Mean-Group and Pooled Mean-Group Estimators 
The panel cointegration test of Westerlund (2007) shows whether there is a long-term 
relationship or not; it does not show the short-run and long-run estimates. Recent advances in 
the non-stationary panel literature offer different estimation techniques to identify efficient 
parameters for relatively large (N) and (T) panels. In this study we applied three alternative 
estimation techniques, namely, the dynamic fixed effect (DFE) estimator, the mean-group 
(MG) estimator of Pesaran and Smith (1995) and the pooled mean-group (PMG) estimator of 
(Pesaran et al., 1999). 
The DFE estimator pools each of the countries; it makes the estimators of the cointegrating 
vector, the speed of the adjustment coefficient and the short run coefficients to be equal across 
all countries. Thus in the DFE model, the slope coefficients and error variances, except the 
intercepts, are constrained to be equal across panels (Pesaran et al., 1999). 
In contrast, the MG estimator relies on estimating N time-series regressions and averaging the 
country specific and time-series parameter estimates. The parameters are simply the un-
weighted means of the individual coefficients. This estimator allows the intercepts, slope 
coefficients, and error variances to vary across groups. Under heterogeneity of slope 
coefficients, the MG is consistent because it considers complete parameter heterogeneity across 
cross-sections. However, the estimator does not recognise that some economic conditions could 
be common across group of countries in the long-run (Pesaran et al., 1999). 
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The PMG estimator provides efficiency gains as it recognises the common economic features 
across the countries. The PMG estimator combines both pooling and averaging and recognizes 
the diversity within each cross section. It allows the intercepts, speed of convergence, short run 
coefficients, and error variances to differ freely across groups, but imposes homogeneity on the 
long-run coefficients. The long run coefficients are a nonlinear function of short run parameters 
(Pesaran et al., 1999). 
There are several gains in using the PMG estimator over other commonly used dynamic panel 
data estimators i.e. panel dynamic OLS (DOLS) of Pedroni (2001); panel fully modified OLS 
(FMOLS) of Pedroni (2000); GMM  of Arellano and Bond, (1991) and  Blundell-Bond (1998). 
DOLS and FMOLS require pretesting for unit roots in the dependent and independent variables 
as well as pre-testing for cointegration between integrated regressors. The stationary variables 
that do not appear to be part of the estimated cointegrating vector are usually eliminated 
(Pedroni, 2000, 2001). For example, if any of the variables, say bank credit, and government 
consumption are stationary, I (0); and other variables such as oil price, and non-oil GDP per 
capita are non-stationary, 1(1); some variables will be dropped in the DOLS/FMOLS in order 
to keep the same order of integration. Therefore, we ignore these dynamic panel data estimators.   
Generalised methods of moment (GMM) addresses potential misspecification and obtains 
consistent estimates in the presence of endogenous regressors. However, Pesaran et al. (1999) 
argue that the GMM estimation procedure for the dynamic panel data model can produce 
inconsistent and misleading coefficients of the long run coefficients. The problem is 
exacerbated when the time denomination of the panel is large. GMM captures only the short-
run dynamics and the stationarity of the variables are ignored because the models are mostly 
restricted to short time series. Thus, it is not clear whether the estimated panel models represent 
a long-run equilibrium relationship or a spurious one (Christopoulos and Tsionas, 2004). More 
so, the imposition of homogeneity assumptions on the slope coefficients of lagged dependent 
variables could lead to serious biases (Kiviet, 1995) 
Pesaran et al. (1999) showed the consistency of the PMG estimator even if the variables of 
interest are integrated or stationary, endogenous or deterministic. Therefore, in estimating the 
PMG estimator one might not need to check for the presence of unit roots in the panel variables. 
The PMG assumes cross-sectional independence of the regression residuals. In panels with 
large N and large T, it is also important that the regression errors are serially uncorrelated. The 
inclusion of sufficient lags of the right-hand side regressors will ensure that the regression errors 
are serially uncorrelated and the explanatory variables are exogenous and thus provide 
consistent and efficient parameters of interest (Pesaran et al., 1999) 
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There are good reasons to believe that the long run equilibrium relationship amongst the 
variables of interest should be identical across the oil-rich economies (i.e. the presence of a 
global common factor, oil prices), while the short run dynamics are heterogeneous. Thus, the 
PMG estimator is likely to capture the true nature of the data. However, making a choice 
between DFE, MG and PMG can be tested using the Hausman test. Under heterogeneity of 
slope coefficient, the DFE approach would produce inconsistent and potentially misleading 
results (Baltagi at al., 2000). The Hausman test checks the validity of the DFE estimator against 
the MG estimator. Under the assumption of homogenous long-run elasticities, both the PMG 
and MG estimators are consistent. But if the true long-run parameters are heterogeneous, the 
PMG estimation will produce inefficient and inconsistent estimates. In this case, the MG 
estimates are consistent. 
The Hausman test examines the trade-off between consistency and efficiency in the choice 
between the two estimators. It first calculates the difference between the MG and PMG 
estimators, then it compares the difference (scaled by the variance-covariance matrix of the 
efficient model) to critical values from the chi-squared distribution. Under the null hypothesis 
of cross-section parameter homogeneity in the long-run, one would expect the difference to be 
small. Therefore, if the p-values are > 0.05) (i.e. insignificant, use PMG)4 
Let us assume that the long-run growth relationship is given by: 
 
Yit  =  θ0i  +  θ1iBANKCREDITit  +  θ2i GOVERNMENTSIZEit +  θ3i TRADEOPENNESSit   +  θ4iOILPRICEit + 
α1it   +  uit           
                                                                                                                                                             (3.6) 
 Assume the variables in equation (3.6) are I (1) and cointegrated. This implies  𝑢𝑖𝑡 is an I (0) 
process for all i and is independently distributed across t. They are also assumed to be distributed 
independently of the regressors. Suppose our maximum lag of every variable is one, the 
autoregressive distributed lag, ARDL (1, 1, 1, 1, 1), model becomes: 
Yit  =  uit +  10iBANKCREDITit  +   11iBANKCREDITit−1+  20iGOVERNMENTSIZEit     
21iGOVERNMENTSIZEit−1 +  30i TRADEOPENNESSit + 31i TRADEOPENNESSit−1  +   40i OILPRICEit  
+  41i OILPRICEit−1   +   β1it  +  iYit  +   eit        
                                                                                                                                                            (3.7)   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
                                                          
4 (Pesaran et al., 1999) 
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 The error correction equilibrium representation is derived as: 
Yit  = i (Yit−1  − θ0i   −  θ1iBANKCREDITit −   θ2i GOVERNMENT SIZEit −  θ31TRADEOPENNESSit  − 
θ4iOILPRICEit –   α1it )   −   11iBANKCREDITit−1 −  21iGOVERNMENTSIZEit−1  − 31i 
TRADEOPENNESSit−1  −  41i OILPRICEit−1   +   eit    
                                                                                                                                             (3.8)   
  
Where θ0i = uit  1−i , θ1i =
10i+11i 
1−i
 ,  θ2i = 
20i+21i
1−i
 , θ3i =
30i+31i
1−i
 ,  θ4i = 
40i+41i
1−i
 , 
i – 1 –  i 
The results obtained using the mean group (MG) and the dynamic fixed effect (DFE) will be 
reported to facilitate comparison. 
 
3.3 Econometric Analysis (B) 
This section presents the empirical model and the estimation approach used in this study. 
3.3.1 Model Specification 
In line with the modified Emran and Farazi (2009) theoretical framework, equation (3.9) 
constitutes the baseline specification of the empirical dynamic panel data model involving 
government domestic borrowing and changes in private sector credit and/or lending rates. 
Cit =  Ci,t−1  + xitβ   +  ui,t                                                                                               (3.9)     
More specifically, the estimated model is in the form: 
Cit =  Ci,t−1  + xitβ   + vi +  it                                                                                        (3.10)                
 
Where   is a scalar such that    < 1;   is an unknown parameter of the lagged endogenous 
variable, β is the unknown parameter vector of the K exogenous variables, 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 as row vector of 
explanatory variables with the dimension of K = n x 1 with n equals the number of exogenous 
variables, but it is acknowledged that  these variables may not be exogenous, it has 
unobservable country-specific, time-invariant effects, (𝑣𝑖) and the residuals (𝑖𝑡), such that  𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
= 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡. Where the residuals (𝑖𝑡) are white-noise such that the 𝑖𝑡  IID (0,  
 2), 𝑣𝑖  IID 
(  𝑣
 2), i = 1, 2, 3,…..N is an index for individual sample of oil-dependent countries, where N = 
28, t = 1, 2,3,….T is an index for time-variant periods, in this case, years, so that T = 6 for four-
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year average base estimation such as 1990-1993, 1994-1997, 1998-2001, 2002-2005, 2006-
2009, 2010-2012 whilst T = 23 for the estimations involving the study period, 1990-2012.  
This model is based on the assumptions that (i) the error term is orthogonal to the exogenous 
variables so that  E (xit  it) = 0; (ii) the independently and identically distributed error terms 
are uncorrelated with the lagged endogenous variable implying that E(Cit−1  it) = 0; (iii) the 
exogenous variables might be correlated with the individual effect, for which reason  E (xit   vi) 
 0; (iv) the past value is prone to affect the present such that  E (Cit  Ci,t−1)  0, so there is a 
need to capture the dynamic effects of the dependent variable and, (v) the country-specific 
effect and the disturbance error are independent of each other E (vi  it) = 0 
3.3.2 Estimation Approach 
The estimation approach is presented under four sub-themes: Static panel (OLS, Fixed effect), 
Dynamic OLS, Dynamic panel (i.e. Difference and System Generalised Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimators), and sources of bias i.e. instruments proliferation, the Sargen test for over 
identifying restrictions, and the Arellano-Bond test for second-order serial correlation.  
3.3.2.1 The pooled OLS estimator: 
yit = xit β + ( vi +  it ), t = 1, 2… T; i = 1, 2 …N                                                              (3.11)   
Assumption (a): 𝑣𝑖  is uncorrelated with  𝑥𝑖𝑡 : E (𝑣𝑖  𝑥𝑖𝑡) = 0  
Assumption (b): E ( 𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑡) = 0; (𝑥𝑖𝑡 is a vector of independent variables that can be exogenous 
or endogenous) 
The problem is that we do not observe 𝑣𝑖  which is constant over time for each individual but 
varies across individuals. Hence if we estimate the model in levels using OLS then 𝑣𝑖 will go 
into error term. But if 𝑣𝑖 is correlated with 𝑥𝑖𝑡, then putting 𝑣𝑖 in the error term will lead to an 
omitted variable problem. In other words, OLS estimation will lead to biased and inconsistent 
results if i.e. E ( 𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑣𝑖)  0 
If the dynamic panel model is used to estimate OLS, the problem is even worse, because the 
lagged dependent variable, 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 in addition to other independent variables may likely be 
correlated with the error term. There is a clear simultaneity problem as the lagged dependent 
variable is correlated with the error term by virtue of its correlation with the time-invariant 
component of the error term. Bond (2002) showed that standard results for omitted variable bias 
indicate that the OLS levels for the lagged dependent variable, 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 is biased upwards. 
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3.3.2.2 The Fixed-effects ("Within") estimator: 
We have seen that if  𝑣𝑖 is correlated with the variables in the  𝑥𝑖𝑡 vector, there will be an 
endogeneity problem which will bias the OLS estimates. Under these assumptions, we can use 
the fixed effect estimator to obtain consistent estimates of β allowing 𝑣𝑖 to be freely correlated 
with  𝑥𝑖𝑡. To see how the fixed effect estimator solves the endogeneity problem that 
contaminates the OLS estimates, we begin by taking an average of equation (3.11) for each 
individual. This yields: 
y ̅= x̅iβ + (vi +  ̅it )                                                                                                            (3.12)                                                                                                                        
                                                                        
y ̅= (∑ yit
t
t=1 )/T, and so on. Next subtract equation (3.12) from (3.11)                
yit − y̅i  = ( xit - x̅i) β + (vi - vi  + it  - ̅it ) 
yit − y̅i  = ( xit - x̅i) β + (it  - ̅it ) 
Since 𝑣𝑖  is constant over time, 𝑣𝑖   term in the equation does not have the over-bar. Notice that 
this transformation eliminates the fixed effect 𝑣𝑖 .  Note also that this transformation eliminates 
the constant as well 
Which we write as: 
ÿit = ẍit β + üit,       t = 1, 2….T:  i = 1, 2…N                                                                    (3.13) 
The problem of estimating equation (3.13) as a ‘fixed effect’ is that it will not account for 
dynamics; many processes display dynamic adjustment over time and ignoring the dynamic 
aspect of the data is not only a loss of potentially important information, but can lead to serious 
misspecification biases in the estimation. Secondly, it does not control for simultaneity whereby 
?̈?𝑖𝑡 could be causing ?̈?𝑖𝑡 and vice versa. For example, if we estimate the fixed effect model with 
a dynamic setting (i.e. with a lagged dependent variable to account for dynamics) such as  ?̈?𝑖𝑡 
=  𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1  + ?̈?𝑖𝑡  𝛽 + ?̈?𝑖𝑡. The Within-Group estimator transforms the equation by eliminating 
𝑣𝑖 . However, (most especially for panels where the number of times periods available is small) 
the transformation induces a correlation between the lagged dependent variable (𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1) and 
even the (?̈?𝑖𝑡 𝛽) with the error term (?̈?𝑖𝑡). Then, strict exogeneity which implies that the 
regressors are orthogonal to the error term for all observations such that E ( 𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑡) = 0, is 
violated. One implication of this is that the fixed effect model may not yield consistent estimates 
if 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 contains lagged dependent and independent variables. Bond (2002) shows the standard 
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results for omitted variable bias indicates that the fixed effect lagged dependent variable, 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 
is biased downwards.  
3.3.2.3 Difference Generalised Method of Moments: 
We then apply the Difference GMM approach proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995). This 
estimation procedure is especially appropriate when: (1) the explanatory variables are 
endogenous; and (ii) unobserved country-specific effects are correlated with regressors. Under 
the assumption that the explanatory variables are endogenous i.e. E( 𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑢𝑖,𝑡. )  0.   
Arellano and Bond (1991) showed that the following moment conditions hold for the equations 
in first differences.  
 
 Rit = xit β  + ( vi +  it ), 
 Rit = ( Ri,t−1 –  Ri,t−2) + (βxi,t –  βxit−1 )   +   (ui,t – ui,t−1)   
 E ( ui,t Ri,t−r)  = 0;      E ( ui,t xi,t−r) = 0;  
Where r  ≥ 2,….. and  t = 3,……T 
 Rit = ( Ri,t−1)  +  ( xi,t )   +   (ui,t – ui,t−1)                                                                        (3.14)        
Therefore the lagged values of endogenous variables dated t – 2 and earlier are valid instruments 
for the equations in first differences. Arellano and Bond (1991) noted that although there is a 
correlation between the level of right-hand side variables 𝑋𝑖,𝑡, 𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 and the disturbance 
error 𝑢𝑖,𝑡, no such correlation exists between ( 𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2) (𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2)  and the error term,  (𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
– 𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1) because ( 𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2) (𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2) are mathematically related to  (𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1)  =  (𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 –  𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2) 
but not the error term,  (𝑢𝑖,𝑡 – 𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1). Instrumenting with  (𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2)    rather than    (𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2)   is 
preferable   because (𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2)   is not available until T = 4, where as  (𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2)  is available at T 
= 3. However, in the context of the model specification in equation (3.14), there are possible 
problems with the use of the first-differenced GMM estimator. When the lagged values of the 
series are weakly correlated with the first difference, they can yield parameter estimates that 
suffer from large finite sample bias because of weak instruments. Secondly, when the individual 
series for the lagged dependent and independent variables are highly persistent, the problem is 
more severe because it will difference out the variables. 
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3.3.2.3 System Generalised Method of Moments: 
Blundell and Bond (1998) showed that the moment conditions defined for the first-differenced 
equation can be combined with the moment conditions defined for the level equation to estimate 
a system GMM. The assumptions still hold: the explanatory variable is treated as endogenous. 
The GMM system estimator utilizes the following moment conditions: 
 Rit = (Ri,t−1 ) + (xi,t  )  +   (ui,t – ui,t−1)                                                                     (3.15) 
 Rit = ( Ri,t−1) +  (βxi,t)   +   (ui,t )                                                                                 (3.16) 
 E ( ui,t Ri,t−r )  = 0;            E ( ui,t xi,t−r) = 0;  
       Where r = 2,….. t – 1 and t = 3,….T 
 E ( ui,t Ri,t−r)  = 0;             E ( ui,t xi,t−r) = 0;  
       Where r = 1,….. t – 1 and t = 3,….T 
The estimator combines the equation in differences in equation (3.15) with the equation in 
levels in equation (3.16) into a single equation. It uses the lagged levels of dependent and 
independent variables as instruments for the difference equations and the lagged differences of 
dependent and independent variables as instruments for the level equation. Thus by allowing 
for more instruments the estimated coefficients of the Blundell and Bond (1998) are not only 
more efficient, but also more consistent than other alternative techniques of dynamic panel 
analysis. The Blundell and Bond (1998) GMM is popularly referred to as a System-GMM 
because it is composed of moment restrictions for equations in differences and levels resulting 
in an efficient estimator that is robust to panel-specific autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. 
3.3.3 Sources of Bias 
The main econometric concern with the GMM approach is the problem of instruments 
proliferation (Roodman, 2007). The instrument proliferation is when a large collection of 
instruments over-fits the endogenous variables. Roodman (2007) concludes that symptoms of 
proliferation become noticeable only when T >15, implying a longer time horizon reduces 
instrument validity. In a simulation exercise, when T=20, the full instrument variant detects it 
with an average P-value on the Hansen J test of 1.00. This implies that System GMM is not 
suitable for longer periods. The two conventional techniques to address instrument over-fitting 
in dynamic GMM panels are to limit the lag depth by selecting some of the lags to be included 
in the instrument set. Another approach is to collapse the instrument set to the extent that the 
orthogonal condition no longer needs to be valid for any one time period but still for each lag.  
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Furthermore, if a dynamic panel-data model is over-identified, it should be possible to verify if 
the excluded instruments are correctly independent of the residual process. Therefore, to test 
for the joint validity of the instruments used, the study adhered to the suggestions by Arellano 
and Bond (1991), and Roodman (2007) inter alia by conducting the Sargan-Hansen test for 
over-identifying restrictions after the System GMM estimation. The routine Sargan-Hansen test 
is formulated with the null hypothesis that the instruments used as a group are exogenous, 
therefore, the higher the p-value of the test statistic, the better. The Sargan-Hansen test is often 
weak in small N where the number of instruments is large and exceeds the number of groups. 
This suggests that System GMM is not suitable for small numbers of groups, firms and 
countries, and more appropriate when T < N. 
If heteroscedasticity is present, the GMM estimator is more efficient than the IV estimator, 
whereas “if heteroscedasticity is absent, the GMM estimator is no worse asymptotically than 
the IV estimator” (Baum et al., 2003: 11). There is no proof suggesting, however, that in the 
presence of homoscedasticity, other panel-data estimators in a dynamic context are more 
efficient than the sys-GMM estimator. According to Baltagi (2008:87) “homoscedastic 
disturbances when heteroscedasticity is present will still result in consistent estimates of the 
regression coefficients, but these estimates will not be efficient” because of biased standard 
errors. This requires the researcher to compute robust standard errors to correct for possible 
heteroscedasticity (Baum et al., 2003; Roodman, 2007; Baltagi, 2008; Chan et al., 2012). 
Robust estimation by two-step GMM automatically generates homoscedastic standard errors.  
Following the recommendations by Arellano and Bond (1991) which were later substantiated 
by Blundell and Bond (1998), Greene (2003), and Baltagi (2008), the Arellano-Bond test for 
autocorrelation is examined. The A-B test is specially designed to detect second-order serial 
correlation (AR (2)) in the idiosyncratic disturbance term within a GMM framework. Arellano 
and Bond (1991) proved that the A-B test is critically important because the consistency of the 
GMM estimator is dependent upon the realism of the condition that E (𝑖𝑡  𝑖,𝑡−2) = 0. The 
A-B test for autocorrelation is based on a null hypothesis of no autocorrelation and it is applied 
to the differenced residuals. It is for this reason that the A-B test for AR (1) process in first 
differences usually rejects the null hypothesis essentially because (𝑖𝑡 =𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑖,𝑡−1) and 
(𝑖,𝑡−1 =  𝑖,𝑡−1  − 𝑖,𝑡−2), both have 𝑖,𝑡−1 (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 
2000). It is absolutely imperative that there is no second-order serial correlation. 
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                                                Chapter 4 
                                                             Empirical Results 
 
4.1 Financial Intermediation 
4.1.2 Panel unit roots 
The dataset includes a time period of 23 years, though not too long it is very likely that the 
macroeconomic variables will have a unit root (Nelson and Plosser, 1982). We employ the 
panel unit root test to determine the order of integration for all the series in our dataset. We use 
Fisher-type panel unit root test because our dataset is unbalanced. The testing for the order of 
integration of variables is not important when applying the dynamic fixed effect, the mean-
group, and the pooled mean-group estimators as long as the variables of interest are I(0) and 
I(1) (Pesaran and Smith, 1995; Pesaran, 1997; Pesaran et al., 1999). However, we carry out this 
tests to ensure that no series exceeds I (1) order of integration.  
Table 4.1 reports the results of the unit root tests, which suggest that one of  the variables under 
consideration (i.e. non-hydrocarbon GDP) is stationary of order I(0), while bank credit, 
government expenditure, trade openness, and the price of crude oil are integrated of order I(1). 
The results show all variables are stationary at first difference. 
Table 4.1 Panel unit root tests   
                                                                                   Fisher-type test  
                                                              
                                                             Level                                                   Ist Difference 
 
 Notes: all unit roots are implemented with a constant and trend and take the unit root as the null hypothesis.     
 The lags are chosen according to the Akaike criterion.  Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
4.1.3 Panel cointegration tests 
The cointegration test identifies the presence of long run relationships among the integrated 
variables. The right lag-length is crucial since excessively short lags may fail to capture the 
Variables Test Values         P-values      Test Values          P-values 
Non-Hydo. GDP    -4.8361          0.0001       -18.4309           0.000 
Bank Credit    -0.6069          0.2719       -14.5823           0.000 
Govt. Consumption    -1.3236          0.0929       -16.4452           0.000 
Trade Openness    -1.4412          0.1747       -19.0764           0.000 
Price of Crude Oil     1.7918          0.1634      - 21.4115           0.000 
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system’s dynamics, could lead to omitted variables, or bias the remaining coefficients, and be 
likely to produce serially correlated errors. Meanwhile too long a lag leads to a rapid loss of 
degrees of freedom and to over-parameterization (Kireyev, 2000).  Given the small number of 
variables included in our study and the somewhat short time dimension of the time series, the 
system could not be tested for a lag length of more than two. In order to choose an optimal lag 
and lead length for each series, we use the AIC criterion while the Bartlett Kernel window width 
is set to 4/ (T/100)2/9= 3.  Since the results show all variables are stationary at first difference 
and integrated of order 1(1), our next step is to apply the panel cointegration test using the first-
difference variables.  
Table 4.2 summarizes the result of the Westerlund (2007) cointegration test. The cointegration 
test shows that bank credit and non-hydrocarbon GDP per capita are not cointegrated, whereas 
bank credit and GDP per capita are cointegrated. More specifically, in testing for the existence 
of a long-run relationship between bank credit and non-hydrocarbon GDP per capita, both the 
𝐺𝑎 and 𝑃𝑎 test statistics accept the null of no cointegration; this suggests there is little evidence 
of cointegration. However, in testing for the existence of a long-run relationship between bank 
credit and GDP per capita; only  𝑃𝑡  test statistics accepts the null of no cointegration. Hence, there 
is some evidence of cointegration. 
Table 4.2 Westerlund (2007) Panel cointegration test 
                  Nonhydrocarbon GDP Per Capita                            GDP Per Capita 
 
 Test             Value             Z-value          P-value                      Value           Z-value         P-value       
 
Notes:  the Westerlund (2007) tests take no cointegration as the null. The test regression is fitted with a 
constant, and a range of lags (1 2) and leads (1 2).  
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Westerlund (2007) warns that, in small datasets (such as this study with T= 23), the results may 
be sensitive to the choice of parameters such as lag and lead lengths and the kernel width. 
Hence, to avoid over-parametrization, we restrict the short-run dynamics and use a shorter 
kernel window (e.g. Westerlund, 2007; Demetriades and James, 2011). The test results still 
accepts the null of no cointegration for non-hydrocarbon GDP per capita, and rejects the null 
of no cointegration GDP per capita. The optimal changes in lags, leads and band width did not 
significantly alter the results. Panel data models are likely to exhibit significant cross-sectional 
Gt -4.058 -11.212 0.000 -3.974 -10.658 0.000 
Ga -13.32 -1.132 0.129 -13.415 -1.207 0.000 
Pt -17.383 -7.225 0.000 -16.991 -6.767 0.114 
Pa -10.339 -1.227 0.110 -16.597 -6.771 0.000 
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dependence in the errors, which could arise due to the presence of common shocks and 
unobserved components that become part of the error (Pesaran, 2004; Baltagi, 2005). One 
reason for this may be the increasingly economic and financial integration of countries, and 
particularly in our study, the common shock of oil price fluctuations that affects government 
spending, which implies a likely strong interdependencies between cross-sectional units. We 
use the Pesaran (2004) CD test on the residuals of the FE specification. The CD test statistic is 
normally distributed under the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence. The absolute 
correlation is (Pesaran test of cross sectional independence = 40.368, Pr = 0.0000; Average 
absolute value of the off-diagonal elements = 0.292) is significant. This strongly indicates the 
presence of a common factor affecting the cross sectional units; thus the presence of cross-
sectional dependence. 
We bootstrapped robust critical values for the test statistics. Bootstrapping corrects critical 
values in tests; it reduces the difference between the true and nominal rejection probabilities. 
Our results show 𝐺𝑖 test statistics accept the null of no cointegration for non-hydrocarbon GDP 
per capita and 𝑃𝑖 test statistics accepts the null of no cointegration for the whole sample. 
However, for GDP per capita, the no cointegration null is rejected for 𝐺𝑖 at the 5% level and 
for 𝑃𝑖  at the 10% level (i.e. when 𝑃𝑖 is restricted to be homogenous) which suggest that the 
whole panel is cointegrated. The results with the bootstrapped p-values provide stronger 
evidence of cointegration. The computed values of the asymptotic and bootstrapped p-values 
are presented in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3 Westerlund (2007) Panel cointegration test, bootstrapped 
             Nonhydrocarbon GDP Per Capita                         GDP Per Capita 
 
Test        Value        Z-value      P-value    Robust P-value     Value         Z-value     P-value    Robust P-value     
 
Notes: Because the Akaike optimal lag and lead search are time-consuming when combined with boot-
strapping, we held the short-term dynamics fixed. 
 
Gt -2.518 -0.985 0.162 0.136 -2.101 -0.736 0.048    0.027 
Ga -7.188 3.753 1.000 0.511 -7.812 -2.837 0.038    0.021 
Pt -11.021 0.179 0.571 0.351 -10.263 -9.462 0.046    0.034 
Pa -6.283 2.287 0.889 0.385 -8.173 -1.287 0.062    0.056 
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               Table 4.4 Non-Oil GDP = (Bank Credit, Govt. Consumption, Trade Openness, Oil Price) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     Note:*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10 %, 5 % and 1 %, respectively. 
                     Estimations are estimated using (xtpmg) routine in Stata.  Pooled mean group, mean group, and dynamic fixed effects all control for country and time  
                         effects. 
                     The first panel (LR) shows the long-run effects. The second panel reports both short-run effects (SR) and the speed of adjustment (ec).  
                     The Hausman test indicates that PMG is a more consistent and efficient estimator than MG and DFE. The lag structure is ARDL (1, 1, 1, 1, 1) and the 
                        order of variables is non-hydrocarbon GDP per capita growth, bank credit, government consumption, trade openness, and oil price.  
                                1 PMG is a more efficient estimator than MG under the null hypothesis 
                                2 PMG is a more efficient estimator than DFE under the null hypothesis.  
                      Annual data 1990-2012 
                      Source: Author’s estimations 
                               
 
 
    Pooled Mean Group       Mean  Group     Hausman Test Dynamic Fixed Effect 
          
Variable  Coef.          Std. Error    Coef.     Std. Error     H-test P-value Coef.         Std. Error 
          
Long-Run Coefficients                 
          
Bank Credit -0.014 0.008    0.228 0.129    0.024 0.019 
Government Consumption 0.149*** 0.047    0.828 0.636    0.055 0.102 
Trade Openness 0.003 0.005   -0.138 0.128   -0.013 0.012 
Price of Crude Oil 0.222*** 0.033    0.713 0.894    0.168 0.129 
            Hausman Text
1     2.57 0.636   
            Hausman Text
2     2.21 0.595   
Error Correction Coefficient -0.106*** 0.022   -0.531*** 0.078    0.116*** 0.016 
          
Δ Bank Credit 0.239 0.141   0.152 0.108    0.009** 0.018 
Δ Government Consumption 0.135 0.077  -0.008 0.096    0.079** 0.016 
Δ Trade Openness 0.003 0.016  -0.012 0.023    0.007* 0.002 
Δ Price of Crude Oil -0.192** 0.062  -0.059 0.119   -0.115* 0.031 
Intercept  3.562** 1.486   6.824* 3.679   -3.424* 0.894 
Country  28    28     28  
Obs   539     539        539   
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4.1.4 Dynamic Fixed Effect, Mean-Group and Pooled Mean-Group  
We proceed to estimate the long-run coefficient of non-hydrocarbon GDP per capita as the 
dependent variable. Table 4.4 presents the results of the parameter estimates of the short and long-
runs. We prefer the results obtained using the PMG estimator given its gains in consistency and 
efficiency over the other error-correction based estimations. For comparison purposes, we also 
report the results obtained with the Mean Group and Dynamic Fixed Effect models.  
As discussed in the previous section, the consistency and efficiency of the PMG estimates rely on 
several specification conditions. The first is that the regression residuals be serially uncorrelated 
and the explanatory variables are treated as exogenous. We address this endogeneity concerns in 
two ways: we augment with lags of the regressors and dependent variables to minimize the bias 
and to ensure the regression residuals are serially uncorrelated. The sufficient augmentation of the 
order of the ARDL model can correct for the problem of residual serial correlation and endogenous 
regressions (Pesaran, 2004). In choosing the optimal lag structure, we apply the Akaike Information 
criterion and the Schwartz Bayesian criterion and we constrain our lags to a maximum of three, 
due to our times series dimension and the number of regressors. We could not unnecessarily expand 
the lag structure any further because we would run into problems of the lack of degrees of freedom.  
The second condition refers to the existence of a long-run relationship (dynamic stability) and 
requires that the coefficient on the error-correction term be negative and not lower than -2 (Loayza 
and Ranciere, 2006). We report the estimates for the pooled error-correction coefficient and its 
corresponding standard error. This coefficient falls within the dynamically stable range in the 
PMG, MG, and DFE estimators.  
The third condition is that the long-run parameters be the same across countries. We test the null 
hypothesis of homogeneity and the validity of the long-run homogeneity restriction across 
countries, and hence the efficiency of the PMG estimator over the other estimators, with the 
Hausman test. The Hausman test accepts the null hypothesis of the homogeneity restriction on the 
regressors in the long run, which indicates that PMG is a more efficient estimator than MG. 
Similarly, in comparing the results of DFE and PMG, the Hausman test again clearly favours the 
PMG specification over DFE. The p-values associated with the Hausman Test for PMG, MG, DFE 
are greater than 0.05 and do not reject the long run homogeneity restriction hypothesis. The 
constraint of common long-run coefficient in our preferred estimator, the PMG, has lower standard 
errors and slower speed of adjustment.  
60 
 
The PMG estimator indicates that financial intermediation has an insignificant, albeit negative 
impact in the long-run and a positive and insignificant impact in the short-run on non-hydrocarbon 
GDP per capita growth. The MG estimator suggests financial intermediation has a positive and 
insignificant impact on non-hydrocarbon GDP per capita growth both in the short and long-run. 
The DFE model suggests financial intermediation has a positive and insignificant impact in the 
long-run and a positive and significant impact in the short-run. Since, the Hausman test clearly 
favours the PMG specification over the other error correction based estimations, we focus 
exclusively on PMG. While the PMG results indicate that financial intermediation has no 
significant impact on non-hydrocarbon GDP per capita growth in the long-run; it is noteworthy to 
mention that when pooled together (the oil and non-oil economies), financial intermediation has a 
positive and significant effect on GDP per capita growth in the long-run (see Table 4.5), and not 
surprisingly only oil price boosts hydrocarbon GDP per capita (see Appendix B.3) 
Next, we move to the economic explanation of the results reported on Table 4.4. The results show 
that a 1% increase of bank credit to the economy as a whole increases GDP per capita by 0.06 
percent on average, whereas, 1% increase of bank credit to the non-hydrocarbon sector decreases 
non-hydrocarbon GDP per capita by 0.01 percent on average, though statistically insignificant. A 
1% increase in government consumption increases non-oil GDP per capita by 0.14 percent; 
however, this decreases GDP per capita by 0.15 percent. A $1 increase in the world price of crude 
oil increases non-oil GDP per capita by 0.2 percent. Trade openness has no significant effect in 
non-oil per capita growth. Across countries and over the sample period, bank credit has no 
significant effect on the growth of the non-hydrocarbon sector. In other words, banks do not yet 
provide adequate credit to stimulate non-oil economic growth. 
Our results are consistent with that of Cevik and Rahmati (2013) who reported a negative and 
insignificant relationship between financial intermediation and non-hydrocarbon GDP per capita, 
but inconsistent with those of Hasanov and Huseynov (2013), Samargandi et al. (2013) and Mirzaei 
and  Moore (2015) that reported a positive and significant relationship. Our results indicate that 
financial intermediation made no significant contribution to non-oil GDP per capita growth which 
is, however, inconsistent with general evidence in the empirical literature of the finance-growth 
nexus; although, this is not surprising in the case of oil-rich countries. 
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      Table 4.5 GDP = (Bank Credit, Govt. Consumption, Trade Openness, Oil Price) 
                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                           
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                       Note:  ** and *** indicate significance at 5 % and 1 %, respectively 
                                       Source:  Author’s calculations      
                                     
 
The weak economic activity in the non-oil sector reflects the low level of bank credit in oil-rich 
countries. The non-oil sector cannot bank on growth without lending. The previous related studies 
are all case studies based on time series analysis and more importantly reported results that are 
different. Without delving into the advantages of panel data analysis over time-series data (see 
Hsiao et al., 2007); our panel data analysis shows banks failed to function in a growth-enhancing 
manner. The connection between finance and the growth of the non-oil sector is weak. This study 
finds that higher bank lending increases real GDP growth in oil-rich economies, though, some 
studies (Nili and Rastad, 2007; Barajas et al., 2013) argue that the beneficial effect of private credit 
on economic growth is generally smaller in oil-exporting countries due to weaker regulatory 
    Pooled Mean Group 
    
Variable  
Coef.             Std.   
Error 
Long-Run Coefficients     
    
Bank Credit 0.0567*** 0.014 
Government Consumption -0.158** 0.047 
Trade Openness -0.075 0.005 
Price of Crude Oil 0.071*** 0.033 
    
    
    
Error Correction Coefficient -0.289*** 0.025 
    
Bank Credit 0.631 0.054 
Government Consumption 0.132 0.113 
Trade Openness 0.057 0.205 
Price of Crude Oil 0.178 0.175 
Intercept  3.563 2.247 
Country  28  
Obs   539   
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characteristics and more limited access to financial services. However, combining the oil and non-
oil economies as one entity could be misleading because the oil sectors have more access to finance 
than the non-oil sector, though the oil sector depend less on bank credit, but in the case that 
disproportionate bank credits are lent to the resource sector and we misidentify that as the whole 
sector, then the effect of financial intermediation on growth may be unreliable – could be overstated 
or understated.   
There are possible explanations for the broken link (i.e. inability of banks to support economic 
diversification). First, the financial system in most of the oil-rich countries is still in the 
rudimentary state or at best, transition phase, and has only made modest attempt to lend to the non-
oil sector in the last decade. Financial intermediation needs to reach a certain level of development 
before it could promote economic growth (Berthelemy and Varoudakis, 1996; Cherif and Gazdar, 
2015). Second, the weak institutional environment inherent in the oil-rich economies could explain 
the reluctance of banks to lend outside the oil related businesses as banks avoid risks associated 
with eventual difficulties in loan recovery. Third, the returns from financial intermediation depends 
on the mobilization of savings and allocation of funds to productive investment projects, but due 
to frictions in the market in the form improper allocation of resources, the interaction is not strong 
in the non-oil sector. Fourth, the low level of bank credit reflects mostly supply constraints such as 
lack of competition (given the high profitability of banks in resource-rich economies) which allows 
banks to keep their credit levels low. Be that as it may, the financing needs of the non-oil sector is 
‘unattended’ which has resulted in the level of investment and economic activity running below 
potential. The banking sector does not seem to fulfil its traditional role of a financial intermediary 
by turning customers’ deposits into loans. The ‘broken’ link between the real economy and bank 
credit goes a long way in explaining why bank credits do not result in additional economic growth 
in the non-oil sector. Fixing this link is essential to support economic diversification. 
The coefficient of government consumption is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level. It shows government spending drives growth (i.e. directly and indirectly) through spill over 
effects on non-oil investments and demand for the goods and services provided by private 
businesses. Similar results was found by Treichel (1999) who used cointegration analysis in oil-
rich Oman to study the link between the growth rate of total real expenditure and non-oil real GDP 
growth from 1981-1997. The author found that the non-oil GDP growth could be explained mainly 
by government expenditure. The same result was reported by Kireyev (1998) for the case of Saudi 
Arabia using a pairwise Granger causality from 1969-97. The author found a significant and 
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positive relationship between government spending and growth in the non-oil real GDP growth. 
Cevik and Rahmati (2013) used VAR analysis in oil-rich Libya from 1970–2010 and conclude that 
government spending is strongly associated with non-hydrocarbon economic activity.  
The coefficient for the price of crude oil is positive and significant at 1 percent level. It shows the 
economic performance in oil-rich countries depends significantly on developments in world oil 
prices. Several studies have documented the importance of movements in energy prices in 
determining economic activity. For energy and oil exporters, movements in output are strongly 
related to oil prices changes (Baldini, 2005; Kumah and Matovu, 2005; Husain et al., 2008).  
Our results shows the non-oil economic growth in oil-rich countries is determined by movements 
in oil prices, through their impact on fiscal policy.  
4.2 Crowding Out Effect 
We consider a variety of estimation methodologies, such as pooled OLS, dynamic OLS, fixed- 
effects (FE) panel regression, and difference and system GMM (Generalised Method of Moments) 
dynamic panel regression. 
4.2.1 Government borrowing and private sector credit 
This study deviated from the bank specific factors such as overhead cost, competition, interest 
spread, etc. These explanatory variables were omitted as we improvised the specification according 
to the purpose of our study which is to assess the role of government borrowing from domestic 
banks on private credit to understand the transmission channel of the crowding out phenomenon. 
This simple time series plot in Figure 4.1 indicates that there is a positive correlation between 
public credit and private credit; that is they move together over time. This gives an impression of 
a crowding in effect rather than a crowding out. However, this relationship needs to be further 
investigated using a suitable econometric model. 
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Figure 4.1 Public credit and private credit financed by the banking sector 
     
  Source: World Development Indicators 
 
4.2.2 OLS & Fixed Effect 
The estimated coefficients using pooled OLS is presented in Appendix A.1, with the baseline model 
including all the variables in the last column. The regression results show that the effect of 
government borrowing on private credit is negative and statistically significant across all 
specifications. The estimated size of the coefficient of private credit ranges between -0.144 and -
0.147, with the baseline specification of the model generating the largest impact. In other words, 
over the sample period 1990-2012, government domestic borrowing negatively affected bank 
credit to the private sector. This model does not control for unobserved cross-country 
heterogeneity, but provides a useful baseline case. Indeed, if there are time-invariant individual 
effects, they will be absorbed in the error term, causing correlation between the explanatory 
variables and the residual. Standard results for omitted variable bias indicate that, at least in large 
samples, the OLS levels estimator is biased upwards (Bond, 2002). Next, we use fixed-effect panel 
regression on pooled data. The Hausman test was used to select whether a fixed or random effect 
model was appropriate and the test rejected the hypothesis that the individual effects were 
uncorrelated with the other regressors for the baseline model at the 1-percent level. Using a joint F 
test, we find that our sets of variables are jointly significant in all specifications presented.  
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The estimated coefficients for the fixed effect model is presented in Table 4.6. The regression 
results show that the effect of government borrowing on private credit is negative and statistically 
significant across all specifications. However, the estimated size of the coefficient on private credit 
is now bigger and ranges from -0.207 and -0.272. In other words, when the government borrows 
$1 from domestic banks, it crowds out private credit by $0.20. From all indications, private credit 
to the private sector depends on government borrowing, money supply, institutional quality, and 
income growth. The fixed effect estimator is a better model as it mitigates the omitted variable 
problems by drawing fixed effects out of the error term. Standard results for omitted variables bias 
indicate that, at least in large samples, the fixed effect estimator is biased downwards (Bond, 2002). 
The estimates could be biased due to endogeneity arising from simultaneity as private and public 
credit are mostly determined by the highest achievable performance of the banks given regulatory 
constraints. But we suspect reverse causality might be a trivial issue given the nature of oil-rich 
economies and their banking system (i.e. the close connection between governments and the 
banks); thus, it is likely that public credit will somewhat dictate the direction.  
4.2.3 Government borrowing and lending interest rate   
This study has not drawn heavily on the determinants of the interest rate model such as government 
consumption, private consumption, private savings, etc. These omitted variables are not required 
for our analysis as we improvise the specification according to the purpose of our study, which is 
to assess the role of government borrowing on the lending rate to understand the transmission 
channel of the crowding out effect. Figure 4.2 shows there is no correlation between government 
borrowing and lending rate over time. This gives an impression of no relationship between the two. 
However, this relationship needs to be further examined using an appropriate econometric model. 
4.2.4 OLS & Fixed Effect 
The estimated coefficients using OLS are presented in Appendix A.2. The regression results show 
that the effect of government borrowing on lending interest rate is positive and statistically 
insignificant across all specifications. The estimated size of the coefficient on lending rate ranges 
between 0.016 and 0.028 basis points with the baseline specification of the model generating the 
largest impact. In other words, over the sample period 1990-2012, government borrowing 
contributed to higher domestic lending rates. 
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   Figure 4.2 The relationship between domestic debt and lending interest rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Source: World Development Indicators 
 
As discussed earlier, the simple OLS estimates are likely to be biased as they omit country fixed 
effects and thus are likely to suffer from omitted variables bias. Such unobserved cross-country 
heterogeneity could be from differences in the relationships between banks and governments which 
could be in the form of directed lending to the government by domestic banks, explicit or implicit 
caps on interest rates, public ownership of banks, or through ‘moral suasion’ which is the explicit 
or implicit threats by authorities in order to provide incentives to comply with the authorities, or a 
‘hands-off’ system where there is little or limited role for the government. 
We then used fixed-effect panel regression on pooled data. The Hausman test rejects the hypothesis 
that the individual effects are uncorrelated with the other regressors for the baseline model at the 
1-percent level. Using a joint F test, we find that our sets of variables are jointly significant in all 
specifications presented. Thus we present evidence for the fixed effect model. The estimated 
coefficients represented in Table 4.7, with the baseline model including all the variables in the last 
column. Contrary to the OLS result, the regression results show that the effect of government 
borrowing on lending interest rate is negative and statistically insignificant.
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The estimated size of the coefficient on lending rate ranges from -0.020 and -0.045. In other 
words, if the government borrows 1% of total GDP, it decreases interest rate by three basis 
points, though insignificant.  The fixed effect estimator improves the OLS model by mitigating 
the omitted variable problems, the estimates could be affected by endogeneity resulting from a 
loop of causality between the lending interest rate and government borrowing. Again, this could 
be inconsequential given the relatively strong grip of governments on domestic banks in the 
oil-rich economies. 
4.2.5 Dynamic OLS & Endogeneity 
We employ dynamic OLS as represented in equation (3.9) to check for endogeneity arising 
from simultaneity (i.e. by adding the lagged dependent variable to see if it acts as a regressor). 
The result shows (in Table 4.8) the adjusted R2   increases from static to dynamic OLS which 
reflects the presence of reverse causation (Wintoki et al., 2012). If the lag terms belong there, 
then they should be included to avoid bias. The results also shows “Private credit L.1” and 
“Lending rate L.1” are statistically significant at 1% level respectively which means past values 
of private credit and lending rate explain significant variations in current values and thus 
confirms dynamic relationships. A dynamic process modelled with a static model is invariably 
misspecified and therefore incorrect (Keele and Kelly, 2006). Static models omit dynamics 
which causes dynamic panel bias (Bond, 2002; Baum, 2006), and as a result do not allow us to 
study the dynamics of adjustment (Baltagi, 2008). Omitted dynamics imply that such models 
are misspecified because they omit the entire history of the right hand side variables (Greene, 
2008). There are numerous ways to address endogeneity: (i) the Structural Equation Modelling 
(SEM); (ii) the Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) regression model; and (iii) the Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) estimators. The first two require valid external instruments which 
are difficult to obtain (Flannery and Hankins, 2013; Wintoki et al., 2012). Because of the lack 
of valid external instruments suitable in a panel setting, the GMM estimator approach proposed 
by Blundell and Bond (1998) is the most suitable method to deal with endogeneity issues that 
arises from dynamic nature of the model. The GMM estimator deals with several problems 
encountered in estimating dynamic panel models, such as endogeneity, measurement errors and 
omitted variable bias. There are 28 countries (N) in our sample analysed over a period of 23 
years (T) and as a result there are more countries (N) than years (T). Many authors argue that 
the dynamic panel model is specially designed for a situation where ‘T’ is smaller than ‘N’ in 
order to control for dynamic panel bias (Bond, 2002; Roodman. 2006; Baltagi, 2008). For long 
panels (i.e. small N and large T), the fixed effect estimator may be a better choice because its 
bias decreases as more periods are added (Nickel, 1981). The fixed effect estimator tends to 
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have a relatively small variance when compared to consistent GMM-type estimators. (Harris at 
al., 2008). Further, Judson and Owen (1999) show that the biases of fixed effect estimates of 
coefficients are relatively small. For all these reasons and considering that our dataset is neither 
particularly wide nor long, we present both the fixed effect and GMM estimation results.  
The GMM estimator is best suited to handle biases induced by simultaneity, omitted variables, 
and unobserved country-specific effects and provides for potentially improved efficiency. For 
instance, the problem of potential endogeneity is easier to address in the dynamic panel 
estimates than in static models that do not use internally generating instruments. More so, in 
dynamic GMM estimation, all variables from the regression that are not correlated with the 
error term (including lagged and differenced variables) can be potentially used as valid 
instruments (Greene, 2008). 
4.2.6 Difference & System Generalised Method of Moments 
Finally, we apply a generalised method of moments (GMM) dynamic panel estimator. The  
system-GMM estimation approach is to take the first differences to remove unobserved time-
invariant country-specific effects, and instrument the right-hand variables in the first 
differenced equations using levels of the lagged two periods or more. The system-GMM 
combines this set of equations with an additional set of equations in levels with lagged first-
differences as instruments. Having identified the dynamic panel data model as the most 
appropriate econometric technique for our estimation, we have to decide which dynamic panel 
approach to use. Even though the GMM is the method of estimation of dynamic panel models 
that provides consistent estimates (Baum, 2006; Roodman, 2006), one has to decide whether to 
use ‘difference-GMM’ (DGMM) or ‘system-GMM’ (SGMM). 
We used system-GMM over difference-GMM for the following reasons: The system-GMM 
estimate has an advantage over difference-GMM in variables that are random walk or close to 
being random-walk (Bond, 2002; Roodman, 2006). Since our model specification includes 
macroeconomic variables which are known in economics for the presence of random walk, the 
system-GMM approach seems to be the more appropriate choice. Differencing the variables 
will remove any variable that is constant, such as lending rate.
70 
 
                        Table 4.7  Determinants of lending interest rates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                    The dependent variable is the nominal lending interest rate  
                                    All variables are in log, except oil price, institutional quality, inflation and lending rate.  
                                    The model is estimated with Fixed effect estimator with * and ** indicating significance at the 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively   
                                    Source: Author’s estimations
                                                                                                                             
                    N                  543          543          542          408          408          386          386     
                   R2                0.00         0.03         0.11         0.06         0.12         0.76         0.77     
                                    (31.05)**    (19.29)**    (21.24)**    (5.71)**     (5.40)**     (3.50)**     (3.98)**   
                    _cons            17.804       21.237       23.421       52.489       48.360       18.753       21.669    
                                                                                                                  (2.84)**   
                    Bankcredit                                                                                      0.123    
                                                                                                                   (1.43)    
                    GDPcapita                                                                                       0.123    
                                                                                                    (30.44)**    (30.61)**  
                   Inflation                                                                          0.051        0.051    
                                                                           (3.37)**     (2.86)**      (0.31)       (0.34)    
                    InstQ                                                   -0.555       -0.459        0.030       -0.033    
                                                              (6.90)**                  (4.99)**     (6.16)**     (6.54)**   
                    Oilprice                                   -0.160                    -0.142       -0.098       -0.104    
                                                 (3.64)**      (1.02)      (3.00)**      (0.53)       (0.45)      (2.82)**   
                    Moneysupply                   -0.086        0.029       -0.100        0.021       -0.010       -0.098    
                                     (0.75)       (1.31)       (1.57)       (1.32)       (1.40)      (3.05)**      (1.60)    
                    Domesticdebt     -0.020       -0.035       -0.040       -0.044       -0.045       -0.053       -0.031    
                                                                                                                              
                                   Lendingrate  Lendingrate  Lendingrate  Lendingrate  Lendingrate  Lendingrate  Lendingrate 
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The results of the statistical tests and checks for system-GMM reported in Table 4.9 are:  
As documented by Arellano and Bond (1991), the GMM estimator requires that there is first-
order serial correlation AR (1) but that there is no second-order serial correlation AR (2) in the 
residuals. Since the null hypotheses imply that there is no first-order AR (1) and second-order 
serial correlation AR(2), it means that one could  reject the null hypothesis in the AR(1) test but 
not reject the AR(2) test to get appropriate diagnostics. The results satisfy this test specification, 
0.48 and 0.359 for private credit and lending rate respectively (see Table 4.9) 
The Hansen J-statistic tests the null hypothesis that the model specification is correct and all 
over identifying restrictions are valid, i.e. validity of instruments. The rejection of the null 
hypothesis implies the estimates are questionable. Our Hansen test of over identifying 
restrictions does not reject the null at any standard level of significance (p = 0.86; p = 0.66 
receptively). Hence, it is an indication that the model instruments are valid. 
Roodman (2006) suggests checking for steady-state assumption which can be used to 
investigate the validity of the instruments. In other words, the estimated coefficient on the 
lagged dependent variable in the model should indicate convergence by having a value less than 
absolute unity, otherwise system-GMM is invalid. The estimated coefficient on lagged 
dependent variables are 0.72; and 0.52 respectively, which means the steady-state assumption 
holds.  
Roodman (2007) suggests that one should report the number of instruments used in the dynamic 
panel, since they can generate potentially “weak” instruments that can cause biased estimates. 
First, the number of instruments should not exceed the number of observations, which is the 
case here (26 instruments < 148 observations for the interest rate model; and 24 instruments < 
145 observations for the private credit model). Furthermore, ‘a tell-tale’ sign is a perfect Hansen 
J-statistic with the p-value equal to 1.00. At the same time, the p-value should have a higher 
value than 0.25 (Roodman 2007, p. 10). The Hansen J-test reports p-values of 0.86 and 0.66, 
respectively which satisfies this condition.   
Furthermore, Roodman (2006 & 2007) suggests reporting how one has obtained the ‘optimal’ 
number of instruments. In our case, the instruments came from the use of two lags for levels 
and two for difference. We estimated a number of regressions by increasing or decreasing the 
number of instruments, using a special user-written command ‘collapse’, but other limits did 
not yield better diagnostics, indicating that this number of instruments is the most favourable. 
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                            Table 4.8 The effect of government domestic debt on private credit and lending rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                        This table presents results of static OLS and dynamic OLS. Asterisk * and ** indicate significance at 1% and 5% respectively. 
                                        The p-values are reported in parenthesis. Source: Author’s estimations. 
 
                       Static Models                      Dynamic Models 
                             OLS                                                                OLS                                                        
    Private Credit   Lending Rate    Private credit   Lending Rate 
     
Private credit L.1      0.765*(0.000)  
Lending rate L.1      0.628* (0.000) 
Domestic debt  -0.147*(0.000)   0.028 (0.051)   -0.091*(0.000)   0.016( 0.140) 
Money supply   0.725*( 0.000)  -0.071*(0.004)    0.190*(0.000)   0.053**(0.011) 
Price of crude oil     0.109 (0.675)  -0.050*(0.001)    0.054 (0.710)   0.030 (0.056) 
InstQ   0.183** (0.044)  -0.253*(0.000)    0.018 (0.718)  -0.101 (0.069) 
Inflation  -0.074 (0.159)   0.055*(0.000)   -0.044 (0.146)   0.029* (0.000) 
GDP Per Capita   0.143** (0.032)  -0.137*(0.003)    0.090**(0.019)  -0.092 (0.104) 
Lending rate   0.157 (0.053)    -0.096 (0.058)  
Private credit    0.062(0.053)    0.0529(0.057) 
Constant -137 30 -114 19.9 
N 363 386 360 377 
R2 0.77 0.68 0.98 0.79 
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  Table 4.9 Base model- System-GMM dynamic panel-two step robust estimate 
 
P-values in parenthesis. 
  Private Credit  Lending Rate 
 D-GMM SYS-GMM D-GMM SYS-GMM 
 
Constant -782 
(224) 
-77.39 
(0.563) 
-8.65 
(-1.99) 
86.69** 
(0.016) 
Private Credit L.1 0.261 
(0.110) 
0.725** 
(0.018) 
  
Lending Rate L.1   0.895 
(1.704) 
0.521** 
(0.050) 
Domestic Debt  -0.191** 
(0.036) 
-0.221** 
(0.031) 
-0.051 
(0.263) 
-0.033 
(0.257) 
Money Supply 0.534** 
(0.047) 
0.318** 
(0.032) 
-0.367 
(-0.075) 
-0.125 
(0.109) 
Oil Price 0.674 
(0.811) 
0.236** 
(0.045) 
-0.075 
(0.162) 
-0.038 
(0.642) 
Inst. Quality 0.812 
(3.821) 
0.602** 
(0.042) 
-0.082 
(0.111) 
-0.148 
(0.155) 
Inflation -0.017 
(0.094) 
-0.023 
(0.538) 
0.049*** 
(0.001) 
0.043*** 
(0.000) 
Lending Rate -0.801 
(0.256) 
-0.695 
(0.627) 
  
Private Credit   0.094 
(0.061) 
0.157 
(0.155) 
GDP Per Capita 0.063 
(0.070) 
0.105 
(0.052) 
0.282 
(0.115) 
-0.009 
(0.913) 
     
Countries 28 28 28 28 
Observations 148 148 145 145 
No. of 
instruments 
18 26 16 24 
Hansen J- test 0.847 0.866 0.506 0.661 
Diff. in Hansen 
test 
0.265 0.924 0.678 0.999 
2nd Order 
Correlation 
0.703 0.482 0.397 0.359 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Private credit, domestic debt, money supply. Source: Author’s calculation. 
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The F-test of joint significance reports that we reject the null hypothesis that the independent 
variables are jointly equal to zero (p = 0.000) at any conventional level of significance. Based 
on our various statistical tests, there is satisfactory evidence to conclude that our obtained 
estimates satisfy the key assumptions of GMM estimation.  
Next, we move to the economic explanation of the results reported in Table 4.9. One percent 
increase in government domestic borrowing significantly decreases bank credit by 0.22 per 
cent. An increase in the institutional quality index by 1 increases bank credit by 0.6 percent. A 
$1 increase in the world price of crude oil increases bank credit by 0.2 percent. The first variable 
of interest (Domestic Debt) is negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level; there 
is some crowding out effect on private credit by government borrowing of (-0.22) in absolute 
value which is smaller than the (-1.4) recorded by Emran and Farazi (2009) in a panel of 60 
developing countries. It is also significantly smaller than the (-1.8) reported for Egypt (Shetta 
and Kamaly, 2014). There could be several reasons for this; one might be due to the banking 
structure in oil-rich countries because banks in resource-based economies tend to display higher 
profitability and are more liquid and better capitalized. Therefore, if banks have excess 
liquidity, a higher lending to the government may not result in any significant reduction of 
credit to the private sector. Second, banks in oil-rich economies disburse a small amount of 
private credit to the private sector, that is, the banks are already ineffective in channelling 
resources to the private sector and thus, increased government borrowing would have a smaller 
effect on the already small bank credit. Third, resource firms have better access to global 
financial markets because government ownership often play a big role in the resource sector 
(Wolf, 2009). Therefore, the resource sectors’ access to international loan market might 
contribute to the excess liquidity in the banking sector and thus mitigate government borrowing 
from crowding out banks’ lending to the private sector. 
The second variable of interest (Lending Rate) is statistically insignificant; government 
borrowing does not affect the lending rate banks charge to the private sector. The reason for the 
insensitive interest rate in oil-rich countries could be the increasingly competitive nature of the 
domestic financial system, though unlikely given the high profitability of the banks. It might 
also be a result of the integration among international financial markets, though disputable since 
financial integration is associated with features like liquid equity market, a lower cost of capital, 
and good credit ratings; a rarity in these countries. Then which of the theorems conform to our 
results: the Neo-classical theory of interest rates explains that fluctuations in the interest rate 
arise from variations either in the demand for loans or in the supply of loans. This mostly takes 
place in market-based economies; our research results do not conform to this. The Ricardian 
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equivalence theorem expounds that increases in the deficit financed by fiscal spending will be 
matched with a future increase in taxes leaving interest rates unchanged. This happens mainly 
in economies that have workable tax system; our research results do not conform to this. The 
Capital inflow hypothesis proposed that an increase in the deficit will be financed partly or 
wholly not by domestic savings but by an inflow of capital from abroad, thus interest rates will 
remain unchanged. This occurs mostly in economies with well-developed financial system; our 
research results do not conform to this. The Keynesian model assumes expansionary fiscal 
policy will lead to little or no increase in the interest rate because there is usually unemployment 
in the economy and the interest rate sensitivity of investment is low. Though our results lean 
towards Keynesian model, but it is very likely the reason for the little or no increase in the 
interest rate in oil-rich economies is because the financial markets are underdeveloped and/or 
governments still exert some control on domestic banks since loans are mostly not given 
according to the expected returns on projects but mostly on non-market based considerations. 
The coefficient of ‘Quality of Institution’ is positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level. This shows good institutions enhance banks’ ability to lend to the private sector.  The law 
and finance literature emphasizes the critical role of institutional framework for financial 
development and output growth (see La Porta et al., 1998). The ability of a country’s institutions 
to protect private property and provide incentives for investment is a vital explanation for the 
persistent disparity in financial market development and economic performance across 
countries (Osili and Anna, 2004). Hooshmand et al., (2013) show that oil rent has negative 
effect on financial development (through institutional quality channel) for some selected oil-
exporting countries. Cherif and Dreger (2016) also show that institutional conditions are 
important to explain the development of the financial market in the oil-rich Middle East and 
North African (MENA) region.  
The coefficient of ‘Oil Price’ is positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The 
results show that crude oil price is a key driver of financial intermediary development in oil- 
rich countries. Movements in crude oil price influence fiscal spending (Poghosyan and Hesse, 
2009) which determines the level of economic activities and the demand and supply of financial 
intermediary services. Movements in crude oil prices influence both the liquidity decisions and 
the systematic risk exposure of financial intermediaries in oil-exporting countries which in turn 
influence their ability to make credit available to the private sector (Nwani et al., 2016).  
Government domestic borrowing has a depressing effect on private credit, however, private 
credit in oil-rich countries depends mainly on money supply (which depends on resource 
revenues) and the quality of institutions. 
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                                                       Chapter 5 
                         Conclusion, Policy Implications, and Limitations 
 
5.1  Bank Credit and Non-hydrocarbon Economic Growth 
5.1.2 Introduction 
Oil-rich economies struggle to develop sectors outside the production of raw materials. Natural 
resource sector especially oil and gas do not require as much external financing as other 
industries (Rajan and Zangales, 1998; Guriev et al., 2009). Even though resource sectors in oil-
rich countries depend less on external funding, they have better access to international capital 
markets (Wolf, 2007). In other words, the hydrocarbon sector is better positioned to source for 
bank credit and financial services than the non-hydrocarbon sector due to their better cash 
flows, government ownership, higher profits and better collateral. Financial sector development 
is thus more important for industries with high dependence on external financing. The oil-rich 
economies are dominated by hydrocarbons and thus possess certain characteristics not shared 
by other economies, and the need to diversify is more pronounced because their economic 
dynamics is mainly determined by the prices of hydrocarbons rather than by domestic economic 
activities (Samargandi et al., 2014). Over the last decade, oil-dependent countries have been 
promoting diversification towards the non-oil sector. In particular, significant priority has been 
given to the financial sector. The oil-rich countries have made some attempts to modernize their 
financial systems despite challenges posed by the large hydrocarbon sector and an inefficient 
public sector. To this end, this study explored the impact of bank credit in the growth of oil-
rich economies and tests if it differs in the emerging non-oil sectors. The result shows that, on 
average, bank credit significantly increased economic growth in oil-rich economies but has no 
significant impact in the growth of the non-oil sector. These research results have some policy 
implications. 
5.1.3 Policy Implications  
Oil price contributes significantly to the growth of the non-oil sector. The high dependency on 
oil revenues with swings in oil price adds to the volatility of government revenues and spending 
in oil-dependent countries. Swings in oil price weakens fiscal planning because it leads to 
revenue volatility and volatility has negative effects at the macroeconomic level, on 
productivity growth, and the rate of private sector investment. In fact, swings in oil price 
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undermines macroeconomic management. For long, oil-rich countries have enjoyed excess 
liquidity in the domestic financial system but recently the banking sectors are experiencing 
tightening of liquidity and declining private sector credit growth due to higher cost of funds and 
increased debt financing by governments. While some of the reduction in bank credit growth 
reflects weaker economic conditions and lower demand for loans, the drop in liquidity is mainly 
due to lower oil export receipts which has constrained credit supply, tightened lending and 
undermined the ability of the private sector to pick up amidst downsizing public sector, creating 
negative consequences for growth and job creation. The oil market is inherently cyclical, 
therefore diversifying the economy away from the oil sector will help curtail the downsides of 
swings in oil revenues. 
One way is to increase access to credit available to the non-oil sector. The non-oil sector 
generates more employment and has the potential to absorb the burgeoning labour force. But 
banks are reluctant to hand out loans especially to sectors of the economy outside natural 
resources. Banks look for short-term, profit maximizing investments and fear the fundamental 
risk associated with investing in new activities (Kay, 2012). One of the key impediments of 
financial intermediation in resource-rich countries is the underdevelopment of the banking 
sector and the illiquid and small stock markets (Beck, 2011). Since banks dominate the financial 
system in oil-rich countries and they are reluctant to lend to the non-oil sector and stock markets 
are small with few listed securities, non-bank financial institutions, such as insurance 
companies and pension funds do not play an active role, then options to access the financial 
markets for the non-oil sector tend to be more limited, less efficient and more expensive. The 
outlays for developing the traditional financial system, and especially a larger, more effective 
and efficient market with several types of financial products, can be overwhelming for the oil-
rich countries, and more importantly the process may take time. The question is then: are there 
alternative conduits through which the financially constrained sectors can fund their investment 
before a better-functioning financial system is put together? The role of governments in 
building inclusive financial sectors for development is critical. Governments should lead 
initiatives and encourage alternative sources of finance that are capable of fulfilling this gap. 
This sources can take the form of industrial finance and development corporations. The 
emergence of alternative sources will provide options to the non-oil sector to access financial 
services and also induce competition in the provision of financial services. 
Financial development is critical to assembling domestic savings to fund private sector–steered 
economic diversification. Developing a growth-enhancing financial system requires set of 
structural reforms and policy measures such as re-establishing and maintaining macroeconomic 
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stability most especially through a countercyclical fiscal policy that minimizes the impact of 
volatile oil prices; for instance, policymakers should build up a liquidity fund in good times that 
can be tapped to smooth consumption spending when resource inflows fall short. More so, 
improving the legal framework to protect creditor rights and judicial enforcement, restructuring 
the insolvency system; maintaining and upholding high standards of corporate governance, 
improving competition in the banking sector since competition promotes financial inclusion 
and increases firms’ access to finance (Love and Martinez-Peria, 2012). Improving credit 
information gathering and sharing system will enable banks to better assess credit risk. These 
policy measures will create a conducive environment and hence boost the quality and quantity 
of intermediation to the non-oil sector. 
Government consumption drives the growth of the non-oil sector. But this ignores the fact that 
the economy has limited economic resources and that government spending could actually 
diverts economic resources away from the private sector. Increased government spending may 
induce the private sector to contract and conversely cuts in government spending might release 
economic resources the private sector could use more productively. A considerable share of the 
non-oil growth has been driven by the public sector, but this seems to be running out of steam, 
as government finances become tighter amidst falling oil prices. In other to cut government 
spending without undermining the non-oil economic growth, policymakers should increase 
capital expenditure and reduce recurrent expenditure. The added infrastructure will complement 
private sector investment and thus crowd-in government consumption in some areas, and with 
time scale back government consumption. This will weaken the structural dependence of non-
oil activities on government spending. 
5.1.4 Limitations and future research direction  
Like any other study, our findings also suffer from some limitations. The impact of financial 
intermediation could possibly vary across the countries due to the heterogeneous nature of 
economic structures, institutional quality, financial markets, and non-hydrocarbon revenue to 
total gross domestic product. Although pooling the countries is the most efficient way to 
estimate the empirical model, parameter heterogeneity is a non-negligible concern. In view of 
this, caution should be exercised when interpreting the results. Furthermore, it is almost 
impossible to account for all possible factors that may foster growth; this is because there are 
many variables that could exert an effect on growth.  
This research study used the ratio of commercial bank credit to private sector as a percentage 
of GDP to capture financial intermediation and the quantitative development of the banking 
sector. Future research should incorporate interest rate spread, which is the gap between bank 
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lending and deposits; used as an indicator for domestic banking sector quality, to look at the 
quality of financial intermediation. Other measures could also be incorporated to appraise the 
quality of lending.  This indicator is particularly important in resource-rich economies because 
of the high level of leakage (loans are mostly given according to non-market based 
considerations) in addition to transparency and accountability issues. 
In addition, further research could include other financial sector indicators, such as stock market 
capitalization and the ratio of traded value to GDP (was omitted due to the dearth of long-span 
time series data in some of our sample countries) and more importantly incorporate  
international debt issues (ratio of international debt issues to GDP, which indicates degree of 
access to international capital markets) and loans from non-resident banks (ratio of loans by 
non-resident banks to GDP, which indicates the use of foreign bank loans as a source of finance) 
to estimate the roles of international capital markets and foreign banks in oil-rich economies. 
This research results shed more light on the link between finance and the growth of emerging 
non-oil sector in oil-rich economies; the growth of non-oil sector is crucial to the creation of a 
more inclusive, resilient and sustainable economy, but the reluctance of banks to lend them is 
a handicap. The findings will buttress the case to provide more access to finance for the non-
oil sector and incentivize governments to inculcate policies that will bridge the ‘broken’ link. 
This also calls for intensified efforts in resource-rich economies to deepen and broaden the 
financial sector. 
5.2 Government Domestic Borrowing and Crowding Out Effect  
5.2.1 Introduction 
One of the signs of economic development is the increasing role of the private sector. The level 
of domestic credit to private sector measures financial resources provided to the private sector 
by financial institutions. Credit is the oil that lubricates the engine of an economy; for this 
reason, it’s watched closely to assess economic growth. The higher the credit to private sector, 
the higher the financial resources to the private sector and the greater the opportunity for the 
private sector to grow and develop. The higher this measure, the better is generally the health 
and development of the economy. Bank credit to the private sector is relatively low in oil-rich 
economies which invariably means the private sector has less role to play. Oil-rich countries 
disburse relatively less bank credit to the private sector even though the banks are more liquid. 
The persistent talks in policy cycles and media have increasingly blamed government 
borrowing for crowding out private credit. One of the most common forms of crowding out 
takes place when a government increases its domestic borrowing and because governments 
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have the power to borrow large sums of money, doing so can actually have a substantial impact 
on the real interest rate, raising it by a significant degree. This has the effect of absorbing the 
economy’s lending capacity and discouraging businesses from engaging in capital projects. 
Because firms often fund such projects in part or entirely through financing, they are now 
discouraged from doing so because the opportunity cost of borrowing money has risen. Is 
government domestic borrowing a contributing factor to the low level of private credit in oil- 
rich economies? This study shows that government domestic borrowing has a significantly 
negative effect on private credit but it does not result in an increase in the interest rate charged 
by banks on loans to the private sector. These research results have several policy implications.  
5.2.2 Policy Implications 
The effect of government domestic debt in oil-dependent countries is ‘substantial’ though 
smaller than results recorded in other developing countries and thus shows the peculiar nature 
of oil-dependent economies. However, substantial and persistent levels of government debt can 
cause downward pressure on domestic loanable funds and thus hinder private investment and 
suppress economic growth. The importance of developing and maintaining strong institutions 
to control spending, manage debt and maximize domestic revenue collection cannot be 
overemphasized. There is no significant changes in lending rates as a result of government 
domestic borrowing, therefore governments in oil-rich countries should not be overly 
concerned about whether domestic borrowing affects lending rates, but rather focus on the 
levels of financial intermediation because the quantity of credit changes without concomitant 
increase in the interest rate. 
The key macroeconomic variables in oil-rich economies display a high degree of volatility; 
revenue, debt and spending are highly correlated with the global crude oil price. This volatility 
obscures fiscal policy, requiring the government to turn to debt financing or draw on previously 
accumulated funds to smooth spending in periods when revenue falls below expectations. The 
limited and uncertain nature of hydrocarbon wealth creates challenges in which there is a need  
to transform finite assets and income from depleting natural resources into sustainable wealth 
in the form of financial assets and investment income. Therefore, policymakers should build up 
a liquidity fund in good times that can be tapped to smooth government spending when resource 
revenues fall short. In other words, oil-rich countries should establish an independent sovereign 
wealth fund so that in periods when revenue falls below expectations due to oil price volatility, 
spending can be maintained by drawing on reserves funds. However, without the sovereign 
wealth fund, or even with depleting reserve funds, oil-rich economies will resort to borrowing 
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from domestic banks to fund budget deficits which will exacerbate the already meagre loanable 
funds available to the private sector. 
Banks are more willing to lend to the oil sector, it means the non-oil sector suffers most from 
the increased government borrowing on the already thin loanable funds. In other words, when 
the government borrows from domestic banks, the burden of crowding out falls heavily on 
sectors that struggle to access domestic credit and on borrowers that cannot borrow 
internationally, usually the non-oil sectors rather than the oil sector. While governments are 
encouraged to support alternative sources of finance that are capable of fulfilling this gap, they 
need to consider the potential implications of increased internal borrowing on the burden of 
crowding-out the financially constrained sectors.  
The low credit to the private sector reflects both demand and supply factors. Potential factors 
that reduce credit demand could be a dearth of profitable investment opportunities and the 
availability of alternative financing instruments such as the capital markets. Factors affecting 
loan supply include liquidity, increase in uncertainty, lack of competition in the banking sector, 
underdeveloped capital markets, lack of information about the quality of borrowers, and 
imperfect legal environment. Low credit demand does not appear to be the main reason for the 
low levels of bank lending because alternative financing channels are not readily available, 
rather the low level of bank credit reflects mostly supply and institutional factors such as the 
lack of competition (given the high profitability of banks in resource-rich economies) which 
allows banks to keep their credit levels low. The quality of institutions is critical to boost private 
sector credit; in other words, improving the quality of institutions will curtail the negative effect 
of oil shock and also help to sustain private credit development. 
5.2.3 Limitations and future research direction  
This research study has some limitations that may provide a basis for additional research. Some 
governments tend to borrow less from banks due to their huge foreign reserves. In this case, 
this may have diluted the coefficients’ estimates. Secondly, this research study shows that 
government domestic borrowing did not significantly affect the lending rate domestic banks 
charged to the private sector; however, it did not empirically buttress the reasons for the interest 
rate insensitivity.  
Therefore, future research should empirically investigate whether liquidity fund (i.e. sovereign 
wealth fund) could mitigate government domestic borrowing. Secondly, future research should 
investigate whether oil-rich economies with more diversified financial sector (i.e. Malaysia) 
could ameliorate the suffocating effect of government domestic borrowing since more 
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diversified financial sector promotes competition and creates more opportunities for the private 
sector to source funds. While lots of research have been done on banking sector and private 
sector development since it is assumed that small and medium-size enterprises are more 
dependent on domestic banks, more research should look at whether bank-based or market-
based finance plays a bigger role in private sector development for the case of oil-rich 
economies.  
More study could beam more light to quantify the reasons for the insensitive interest rate in oil-
rich economies. Could it be that it occurs mostly when deficits are high, high domestic debt is 
persistent, financial openness is low, interest rates are not liberalized (when central banks sets 
monetary policy based on quantitative targets, such as loan quotas, to a market system where 
policies are based on market forces setting the price of and hence allocating capital), when 
financial depth is low, or government intervention is high.  
This research results are important for understanding the mechanism through which 
government domestic borrowing affects private investment in oil-rich economies. This is 
because private investment depends critically on the availability of private credit, hence, 
crowding out of private credit may have significantly disadvantageous effects on private 
investment and consequently on economic growth. Notwithstanding the aforementioned 
limitations, our results are interesting: government domestic borrowing has resulted in  the 
shrinking of private credit in oil-rich countries but this works through the credit channel and 
not the interest rate channel. 
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                                            Appendix A 
 
 
A.1 Determinants of real private credit 
The dependent variable is real private credit. All variables are in log, except oil price, institutional quality, inflation and 
lending rate. The model is estimated with OLS. Source: Author’s estimations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                               * p<0.05; ** p<0.01
                                                                                                                                     
             N                   620            620            619            452            452            429            363      
             R2                 0.03           0.91           0.91           0.93           0.93           0.93           0.93      
                              (13.63)**       (1.05)         (0.48)        (3.51)**       (3.52)**       (3.38)**        (2.41)*    
             _cons             243.915        -6.563         -4.400        -119.605       -123.736       -129.305       -137.356    
                                                                                                                         (1.91)     
             Lendingrate                                                                                                  1.547     
                                                                                                                         (2.14)*    
             GDPpercapita                                                                                                 0.143     
                                                                                                          (0.63)         (1.39)     
             Inflation                                                                                     0.018         -0.073     
                                                                           (3.43)**       (3.42)**       (3.33)**        (2.02)*    
             InstQ                                                           2.135          2.130          2.238          1.827     
                                                             (0.32)                        (0.49)         (0.46)         (0.42)     
             Oilprice                                        -0.057                         0.095          0.094         -0.109     
                                             (79.00)**      (76.77)**      (70.50)**      (69.10)**      (67.17)**      (60.70)**   
             Moneysupply                       0.736          0.737          0.714          0.713          0.713          0.725     
                              (4.66)**       (7.82)**       (7.77)**       (7.74)**       (7.58)**       (7.40)**       (7.14)**    
             Domesticdebt       0.274         -0.144         -0.145         -0.143         -0.142         -0.142         -0.147     
                                                                                                                                     
                            Privatecredit  Privatecredit  Privatecredit  Privatecredit  Privatecredit  Privatecredit  Privatecredit 
                                                                                                                                     
84 
 
 
 
A. 2 Determinants of nominal lending interest rates, 1990-2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The dependent variable is the nominal lending interest rate.     
All variables are in log, except oil price, institutional quality, inflation, lending rate. The model is estimated with 
OLS. Source: Author’ estimations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                               * p<0.05; ** p<0.01
                                                                                                                              
                    N                  543          543          542          408          408          386          386     
                    R2                0.00         0.04         0.06         0.15         0.17         0.72         0.73     
                                    (23.02)**    (22.47)**    (17.81)**    (11.38)**    (11.94)**    (12.01)**    (10.09)**  
                    _cons            17.736       19.930       22.957       50.663       53.514       33.562       30.568    
                                                                                                                   (1.81)    
                    Bankcredit                                                                                      0.062    
                                                                                                                  (3.20)**   
                    GDPcapita                                                                                      -0.137    
                                                                                                     (27.48)**    (27.97)**  
                    Inflation                                                                          0.054        0.055    
                                                                           (7.30)**     (7.18)**     (5.31)**     (3.63)**   
                    InstQ                                                   -0.584       -0.569       -0.261       -0.198    
                                                              (3.20)**                  (3.29)**     (3.84)**     (3.12)**   
                    Oilprice                                   -0.083                    -0.087       -0.061       -0.050    
                                                 (4.72)**     (3.60)**      (2.53)*      (1.64)      (3.34)**     (2.78)**   
                    Moneysupply                   -0.060       -0.047       -0.032       -0.021       -0.026       -0.071    
                                     (0.16)       (1.10)       (0.64)       (1.19)       (0.68)       (1.16)       (1.95)    
                    Domesticdebt     -0.004        0.027        0.016        0.027        0.016        0.016        0.028    
                                                                                                                              
                                   Lendingrate  Lendingrate  Lendingrate  Lendingrate  Lendingrate  Lendingrate  Lendingrate 
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                                                  Appendix B 
 
B.1   Pooled Mean Group, GDP per capita 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                 
          _cons     3.563039   2.247066     1.59   0.113    -.8411285    7.967207
                 
            D1.     .0575828   .0205956     2.80   0.005     .0172162    .0979494
  tradeopenness  
                 
            D1.      .178049   .1751988     1.02   0.310    -.1653344    .5214324
priceofcrudeoil  
                 
            D1.     .1428261   .1352697     1.06   0.291    -.1222976    .4079498
      inflation  
                 
            D1.     .1322143   .1148133     1.15   0.250    -.0928156    .3572442
govtconsumption  
                 
            D1.     .0631761   .0541795     1.17   0.244    -.0430138     .169366
     bankcredit  
                 
             ec    -.0289081   .0259764    -1.11   0.266    -.0798208    .0220047
SR               
                                                                                 
priceofcrudeoil     .0712599   .0107336     6.64   0.000     .0502225    .0922973
  tradeopenness    -.0076259   .0061817    -1.23   0.217    -.0197417    .0044899
govtconsumption    -.1583543   .0439463    -3.60   0.000    -.2444875    -.072221
     bankcredit     .0657953   .0142898     4.60   0.000     .0377877    .0938029
ec               
                                                                                 
 D.gdppercapita        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                 
                                                Log Likelihood     = -495.9059
                                                               max =        22
                                                               avg =      18.8
                                                Obs per group: min =        10
Time Variable (t): year                         Number of groups   =        28
Panel Variable (i): region                      Number of obs      =       525
(Estimate results saved as pmg)
Pooled Mean Group Regression
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B.2   Pooled Mean Group, Non-hydrocarbon GDP per capita 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                 
          _cons     3.562686   1.486563     2.40   0.017     .6490758    6.476297
                 
            D1.     .0039609   .0116797     0.34   0.735    -.0189308    .0268527
  tradeopenness  
                 
            D1.    -.1926577   .0628731    -3.06   0.002    -.3158867   -.0694287
priceofcrudeoil  
                 
            D1.     .1357577   .0773481     1.76   0.079    -.0158419    .2873572
govtconsumption  
                 
            D1.      .239426   .1411097     1.70   0.090    -.0371439    .5159959
     bankcredit  
                 
             ec    -.1064617   .0225281    -4.73   0.000    -.1506161   -.0623074
SR               
                                                                                 
priceofcrudeoil     .2227737   .0335471     6.64   0.000     .1570227    .2885247
  tradeopenness      .003631   .0058722     0.62   0.536    -.0078783    .0151403
govtconsumption     .1493759   .0476575     3.13   0.002     .0559689     .242783
     bankcredit    -.0149911   .0084211    -1.78   0.075    -.0314962    .0015139
ec               
                                                                                 
nonhydrogdppe~a        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
D.               
                                                                                 
                                                Log Likelihood     =  -748.593
                                                               max =        22
                                                               avg =      19.3
                                                Obs per group: min =        12
Time Variable (t): year                         Number of groups   =        28
Panel Variable (i): region                      Number of obs      =       539
(Estimate results saved as pmg)
Pooled Mean Group Regression
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B.3   Pooled Mean Group, Hydrocarbon GDP per capita 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                 
          _cons     1.776544   .8891215     2.00   0.046     .0338983    3.519191
                 
            D1.     .0533863   .0192336     2.78   0.006     .0156892    .0910833
  tradeopenness  
                 
            D1.     .3918285   .2201421     1.78   0.075    -.0396421    .8232991
priceofcrudeoil  
                 
            D1.     .0107443     .18101     0.06   0.953    -.3440288    .3655174
govtconsumption  
                 
            D1.    -.2385321   .1784783    -1.34   0.181    -.5883432     .111279
     bankcredit  
                 
             ec    -.0003717   .0108814    -0.03   0.973    -.0216989    .0209555
SR               
                                                                                 
priceofcrudeoil     2.474101   .8913419     2.78   0.006     .7271026    4.221099
  tradeopenness    -.0794124   .0390784    -2.03   0.042    -.1560048   -.0028201
govtconsumption    -.0586894   .0848242    -0.69   0.489    -.2249418    .1075631
     bankcredit     .0191355   .0267848     0.71   0.475    -.0333617    .0716327
ec               
                                                                                 
hydrogdpperca~a        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
D.               
                                                                                 
                                                Log Likelihood     = -692.3294
                                                               max =        22
                                                               avg =      19.3
                                                Obs per group: min =        12
Time Variable (t): year                         Number of groups   =        28
Panel Variable (i): region                      Number of obs      =       539
(Estimate results saved as pmg)
Pooled Mean Group Regression
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B.4   Cointegration Test: Non-hydrocarbon GDP per capita 
 
xtwest nonhydrogdppercapita bankcredit, lags (1 2) leads (1 2) lrwindow (3) constant trend westerlund 
Test                            Value                       Z-value                   P-value         
                                
Gt -4.058 -11.212 0.000 
Ga -13.32 -1.132 0.129 
Pt -17.383 -7.225 0.000 
Pa -10.339 -1.227 0.110 
 
 
 
B.5   Cointegration Test: GDP per capita   
  
xtwest gdppercapita bankcredit, lags (1 2) leads (1 2) lrwindow (3) constant trend westerlund 
Test                           Value                          Z-value                     P-value                                        
 
Gt -3.974 -10.658 0.000 
Ga -13.415 -1.207 0.000 
Pt -16.991 -6.767 0.114 
Pa -16.597 -6.771 0.000 
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B.6   Bootstrap Panel Cointegration Test:  Non-hydrocarbon GDP per capita 
 
xtwest gdppercapita bankcredit, lags (1) leads (1) lrwindow (3) constant trend bootstrap (800) 
 
Test                     Value                Z-value             P-value          Robust P-value      
  
Gt -2.518 -0.985 0.162 0.162 
Ga -7.188 3.753 1.000 1.000 
Pt -11.021 0.179 0.571 0.571 
Pa -6.283 2.287 0.889 0.889 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B.7   Bootstrap Panel Cointegration Test: GDP per capita 
xtwest gdppercapita bankcredit, lags (1) leads (1) lrwindow (3) constant trend bootstrap (800) 
 
Test                       Value                     Z-value                P-value               Robust P-value      
 
Gt -2.101 -0.736 0.048    0.027 
Ga -7.812 -2.837 0.038    0.021 
Pt -10.263 -9.462 0.046    0.034 
Pa -8.173 -1.287 0.062    0.056 
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B.8 Summary of variables used for the government borrowing and crowding out  
 
 
B.9 Summary of variables used for the bank credit and non-oil economic growth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Obs Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Private Credit 622 257 447 0.0917 23335 
Government Credit 620 45 300 -2400 1620 
Interest Rate 580 17 18 5 218 
Money Supply 622 366 595 0.1394 3272 
Institutional Quality 558 55 10 24 78 
Inflation 601 93 1023 -12 23773 
GDP per Capita 637 63 106 2 926 
Oil Price 639 42.3 31.21 13 111 
Variables Obs Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
GDP Per Capita 637 63 107 2 926 
Non-hydro GDP Per Capita  635 40 65.077 0.15 698 
Bank Credit  622 257 447 0.091 2335 
Trade Openness 608 616 999 2.68 6845 
Price of Crude Oil 639 42 21 13 111 
Govt. Consumption  593 117 214 0.215 1199 
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B.10 Sample of countries used in the regression analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Africa Latin America Middle East Eastern Europe Asia Pacific 
     
Algeria Bolivia Saudi Arabia Azerbaijan Papua New 
Guinea 
Angola Mexico Qatar Kazakhstan Indonesia 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
 
Ecuador Syria  Malaysia 
Gabon Trinidad Kuwait  Vietnam 
Nigeria Venezuela Iran   
Cameroon  Yemen   
Chad  Bahrain   
Congo Rep  Oman   
Dem. Rep. 
Congo 
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                                                      Appendix C 
 
 
            C.1  GDP Per Capita and Bank Credit 
 
 
 
 
 
               
         
 
 
 
 
 
            C.2  Non-hydrocarbon GDP Per Capita and Bank Credit 
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         C.3  Non-hydrocarbon GDP Per Capita and Government Consumption  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            C.4  Bank Credit and Bank Credit to Non-Hydrocarbon Sector 
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           C.5  Institutional Quality and Bank Credit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          C.6  Money Supply and Bank Credit 
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